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Abstract
Application of international treaty and customary international law at the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU) is increasingly recognized by scholars as problematic regarding legal certainty. This Article
seeks to illustrate why this is and to propose reform. Through comparing judicial approaches in the appli-
cation of international law at the CJEU to its approach in internal case law, it is argued that in the frequent
absence of proportionality in external case law the Court has utilized, redeployed, or varied other judicial
devices in an effort to retain the discretion which proportionality affords. These are argued to effect legal
certainty and established concepts of justice within the EU legal system. Accordingly, it is submitted that
proportionality should be transplanted fully and openly to external relations case law and that support for
this can be extrapolated from existing literature.
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A. Introduction
Proportionality is the predominant tool for resolving cases in EU law.1 Areas in which its role is
excluded or limited are few,2 however, case law applying international law—external relations case
law—has emerged as one. Proportionality ensures that a given action does not go beyond what is
necessary and does not infringe unacceptably on other rights or legitimate aims. Its impact on the
EU legal system is notable; norms of EU law emerge as non-hierarchical, with the potential for
each to prove most important in the unique facts of a given case.3 This enables the Court to man-
age and develop norms within EU law and provides it significant discretion too.
The large absence of proportionality in external relations case law means that a significant
mechanism for resolving disputes is missing. The result has been a strict hierarchy in which sup-
posedly mechanical rules govern when international law can be relied upon. The reality is very
different though; scholars have become increasingly vocal in exposing the Court’s discretion and
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1GUNNAR BECK, THE LEGAL REASONING OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EU 347 (2012).
2TAKIS TRIDIMAS, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW 136–38 (2d ed. 2006). See also Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs at
1533, ECJ, Case C-120/94, Comm’n v. Greece, ECLI:EU:C:1995:109 (Apr. 6, 1995), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?
language=en&num=C-120/94.
3For example, free movement, fundamental rights, environmental protection, et cetera.
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activism in external relations case law.4 But discretion here, unlike proportionality in internal case
law, is fragmented and manifests itself across inter alia rules of reliance, especially the direct effect
test, opportunistic approaches to interpretation, and recourse to the concept of autonomy.
This significantly influences legal certainty, which the Court has called a “fundamental prin-
ciple of Community law.”5 It recognizes that legal certainty, “requires, in particular, that rules
should be clear and precise, so that individuals may ascertain unequivocally what their rights
and obligations are and may take steps accordingly.”6 We will see that external case law falls
far short of this aim, affecting participants.
This is particularly problematic given that legal certainty and justice are all that law ought to
achieve.7 A significant shortcoming in one is concerning, as they are, “a couple that cannot be ignored
in a functioning and legitimate system of Law.”8 However, our analysis will also reveal issues in exter-
nal case law concerning justice, by which is meant, achieving the right outcome in a given case.
Substantive, or “thick,” justice is contestable, but “thin” justice is widely accepted. Thin justice
can be derived from Aristotle9 and amounts to the assertion that “like cases should be treated alike
and unalike cases unalike to the extent of their unalikeness.”10 Through comparing internal and
external case law we will be well-placed to see that fundamental aspects of the EU legal system are
modified in external case law. This is so despite the Court stating that “an international agreement
cannot affect the allocation of responsibilities defined in the Treaties”11 and asserting that
international law is “an integral part of [EU] law.”12 It will be argued that fundamental changes
largely flow as a result of the large absence of proportionality in external case law. The extent of
“unalikeness”—which would justify divergence from internal case law—and the consequent
exclusion of proportionality will be challenged, particularly given that general principles of EU
law are anticipated to have relevance “in a series of infinite applications of the law,”13 and that
proportionality and other general principles have on occasion been applied in external case law.
4See MARIO MENDEZ, THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF EU AGREEMENTS: MAXIMALIST TREATY ENFORCEMENT AND JUDICIAL
AVOIDANCE TECHNIQUES (2013); Mario Mendez, The Legal Effect of Community Agreements: Maximalist Treaty
Enforcement and Judicial Avoidance Techniques, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 83 (2010).
5See ECJ, Case C-308/06, Intertanko and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2008:312 (June 3, 2008), para. 69, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-308/06. See also ECJ, Case C-344/04, IATA and ELFAA, ECLI:EU:C:2006:10 (Jan. 10, 2006),
para 68, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-344/04.
6ECJ, Case C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2011:864 (Dec. 21, 2011), para. 68,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-366/10.
7Joseph Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823, 841 (1972); LORD DENNING, THE DISCIPLINE OF LAW
293 (1979); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 199 (William Rehg trans., 1997); Stefano Bertea, Certainty,
Reasonableness and Argumentation in Law, 18 ARGUMENTATION 465, 475 (2004); Robert Alexy, The Dual Nature of Law,
23 RATIO JURIS 167 (2010); WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 157 (2d ed. 2012); and
BECK, supra note 1, at 274.
8Bertea, supra note 7, at 475.
9ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 80–88 (David Ross trans., Oxford University Press 2009).
10See, e.g., C.H. PERELMAN, JUSTICE 21–24 (1967); Kenneth I. Winston, On Treating Like Case Alike, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 22
(1974); R.M. HARE, MORAL THINKING: ITS LEVELS, METHOD AND POINT 157 (1981); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 159
(3d ed. 2012); GERARD CONWAY, THE LIMITS OF LEGAL REASONING AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 244 (2012); and
SIONAIDH DOUGLAS-SCOTT, LAW AFTER MODERNITY 185 (2013).
11See, e.g., ECJ, Case C-459/03, Commission v Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:2006:345 (May 30, 2006), para 123, http://curia.europa.
eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-459/03. See also Joined Cases C–402/05 P and C–415/05 P, Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l




12ECJ, Case C-181/73, Haegeman v. Belgium, ECLI:EU:C:1974:41 (Apr. 30, 1974), para. 5, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.
jsf?language=en&num=C-181/73.
13Tor-Inge Harbo, The Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law, 16 EUR. L.J. 158, 159 (2010) (citing NICHOLAS
EMILIOU, THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN EU LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 115 (1996)).
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The need for the Court to address shortcomings in this area is reflected in the mass of proposals
from scholars for reform. However, proportionality has received little sustained attention in
literature concerning external relations case law. It is submitted, though, that scholars’ proposals
for reform—somewhat like the Court’s approaches in external relations case law—often converge
towards proportionality without fully arriving there. Accordingly, this Article offers an initial
exploration of the possibility for extension of proportionality, in its full form, to external relations
case law. It seems this could both improve legal certainty and form a more just basis for the appli-
cation of international law in the CJEU moving forward.
This Article is structured as follows: First, a lack of legal certainty and the necessity of balancing
EU law and interests against international law in external relations case law will be highlighted in
prominent scholarship, with proportionality identified as warranting closer attention; second, the
context and prominence of the application of proportionality in internal case law will be analyzed;
third, the absence of proportionality in external relations case law will be analyzed and reflected
upon through consideration of the judicial tools which have been deployed to facilitate discretion
in its stead. This Article concludes with the pragmatic call for proportionality to be deployed more
openly, frequently and fully in external relations case law.
B. The Rise of Proportionality in External Relations Case Law Scholarship?
I. The Acknowledged Need for Reform of External Relations Case Law
Scholarship can be drawn upon to confirm two primary observations regarding external relations
case law: First, legal certainty is problematic, and second, the case law evidences some balancing of
EU law/interests against international law. The former is important, as the “dual nature” of law
suggests that legal certainty, which is defined as being able to anticipate an outcome, and justice,
which is defined as achieving the right outcome in a given case, are all law ought to achieve.14 In
lieu of an authoritative balance between these aims one would need to be cautious in proposing
reforms. However, due to shortcomings in legal certainty, scholars have been liberated in propos-
ing modifications to the Court’s approach, with most favoring a continuance of the balance
between EU and international law already present, but in modified form. Surprisingly though,
only a few scholars mention proportionality expressly, and those do so only briefly.
II. Concerns Regarding Legal Certainty in External Relations Case Law
Concerning legal certainty in the case law, Holdgaard speaks of a “manifest lack of clarity and
coherence,”15 Skordas of ‘‘counter-systemic commotion,”16 and Odermatt encourages “a more
consistent and principled approach when dealing with international law questions.”17 Etienne
notes “[u]ncertainty” concerning the application of customary international law and direct effect
of international agreements,18 and then calls on the Court generally to say “what it is actually
doing and how it is doing [it].”19 Mendez criticizes the “curt and formalistic” reasoning in
Intrertanko and draws attention to the fact that, concerning the direct effect test, “we are entitled
14Robert Alexy, The Dual Nature of Law, 23 RATIO JURIS 167 (2010). See also Joseph Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of
Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823, 841 (1972); DENNING, supra note 7, at 293; HABERMAS, supra note 7, at 199; Bertea, supra note 7, at 475;
TWINING, supra note 7, at 157; and BECK, supra note 1, at 274.
15RAAS HOLDGAARD, EXTERNAL RELATIONS LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL
DISCOURSES 235 (2008).
16Achilles Skordas, Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit as Comity and the Disquiet of Neoformalism: A Response to Jan Klabbers, in
EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY: LEGAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 116 (Panos Koutrakos ed., 2011).
17Jed Odermatt, The Court of Justice of the European Union: International or Domestic Court?, 3 Cambridge J. Int’l &
Comp. L. 696, 702 (2014).
18Judicaël Etienne, Loyalty Towards International Law as a Constitutional Principle of EU Law? 14 (JeanMonnetWorking Paper
Series, 03/2011, 2011), http://jeanmonnetprogram.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/110301.pdf (last accessed Apr. 30, 2021).
19Id. at 39.
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to expect a credible attempt at reasoned justification for why a particular Agreement will be
deprived of its most potent internal legal effects.”20 Intertanko is also highlighted by
Koutrakos as evidence that the process of direct effect “may be unpredictable,”21 whilst Air
Transport is said to be “staggering in its brevity and lack of clarity.”22
Of course, criticisms of legal certainty will always be present, but they are particularly acute
concerning the application of international law in the CJEU. Our analysis of external relations
case law will confirm concerns of scholars regarding legal certainty; however, the absence of pro-
portionality will be explained as the reason for this to a greater extent than has previously been
undertaken—albeit most scholars favor some balance.
III. Disposing of Two Possible Arguments in Favor of the Status Quo
With legal certainty problematic, two possible avenues remain by which reform in external rela-
tions case law may not be desirable: First, were this construct to be required by international law
itself, and second, were the case law as it currently stands to benefit the EU—for instance, through
a continuing projection of the “good citizen Europe” brand.23
First, it is submitted that international law does not generally dictate the effects which it shall
have in domestic legal systems.24 The Danzig 25 case of the Permanent Court of International
Justice provides a notable exception, but one which was ultimately based on “the very object
of [that] international agreement, according to the intention of the contracting Parties,” and which
the Court recognized went against “a well-established principle of international law . . . [that] an
international agreement, cannot, as such, create direct rights and obligations for private individ-
uals.”26 The narrow exception has not been returned to, indicating its exceptional nature.27 The
more recent LaGrand28 and Avena29 cases arguably indicate the limited relevance of Danzigmov-
ing forward. Both concerned Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, which
allows consulates access to detainees and which the US was accused of breaching. But even in the
face of such specific links to individuals it has been recognized the International Court of Justice
did “not stipulate or imply, that the US courts are required to give direct effect to the obligation.”30
It is thus, widely acknowledged by scholars that there is not an obligation to apply international
law domestically.31 This has been suggested to apply equally to UN Security Council Resolutions,
arguably the most binding of international legal instruments and so, one might think, more prone
to direct effect.32 Of course, the scope for maneuver provided by international law has manifested
20MENDEZ, supra note 4, at 319.
21PANOS KOUTRAKOS, EU INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LAW 266 (2d ed. 2015).
22Id. at 317.
23For use of this term see Tim Dunne, Good Citizen Europe, 84 International Affairs 13 (2008).
24On the interesting and seemingly expanding practice of EU agreements expressing when they will not have direct effect,
see Narine Ghazaryan,Who are the ‘Gatekeepers’?: In Continuation of the Debate on the Direct Applicability and Direct Effect of
EU International Agreements, 37 Y.B. EUR. L. 27 (2018).
25Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig (Pecuniary Claims of Danzig Railway Officials who have Passed into the Polish
Service, against the Polish Railways Administration), Advisory Opinion, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 15.
26Id. at 17–18.
27ANDRÉ NOLLKAEMPER, NATIONAL COURTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW 125 (2011).
28LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27).
29Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 12 (March 31).
30NOLLKAEMPER, supra note 27, at 11.
31Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907 (2006);
Jean d'Aspremont & Frédéric Dopagne, Kadi: The ECJ’s Reminder of the Elementary Divide Between Legal Orders, 5 INT’L
ORGS. L. REV. 371 (2008); NOLLKAEMPER, supra note 27, at 11, 120, 299–304; André Nollkaemper, The Duality of Direct
Effect, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 105, 122 (2014).
32CHRISTINA ECKES, EU-COUNTER TERRORIST POLICIES AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 233 (2009); Matthias Forteau, The Role
of the International Rules of Interpretation for the Determination of Direct Effect of International Agreements, in THE
INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY DOMESTIC COURTS: UNITY, DIVERSITY AND CONVERGENCE 99 (Helmut
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itself in the EU through its own tests of direct effect and its utilization of the concept of an autono-
mous legal system which, “cannot be prejudiced by an international agreement.”33Accordingly,
discretion is both afforded and already taken, as we will see immediately below, and when con-
sidering external relations case law more fully, but direct effect and autonomy have not proven
satisfactory utilizations of it.
Second, accepting that the perception other nations and parties may have is important to
international standing, including the capacity to function effectively on the international plane,
the Court’s case law still falls short.34 Ultimately, remarkably few scholars are supportive of the
current external relations case law of the CJEU without equivocation.35 For instance, the 2008
cases, Intertanko and Kadi, have been described as an annus horribilis for the Court, showcasing
the declining perception of its open approach towards international law.36 Such views have even
become mainstream; Goldsmith and Posner’s brief—and very negative—appraisal of the Court’s
case law appeared in the Wall Street Journal.37
With external relations case law at a remarkably low ebb concerning its utility in raising the
esteem in which the EU is held, problems regarding legal certainty, and international law provid-
ing discretion for domestic courts in applying international law, it is not surprising that many
suggestions for reform have been forthcoming.38 These can now be considered.
IV. Acknowledgement of the Need for Balance Between Protection of EU Law and Respect for
International Law in the Interests of Justice
In their analyses of external relations case law, scholars tend to arrive at an abrogated position
between respecting international law and protecting/promoting EU law/interests. This is achieved
either through recognizing and endorsing elements of balance within current case law or propos-
ing such a balance more generally.
Accordingly, it has been noted that “the Court case-law reflects the balanced relationship
between international law and EU law,”39 “[t]he Court is still trying to find a balance between
protecting the autonomy of its own legal order and the openness towards international law that
Phillip Aust & Georg Nolte eds., 2016). Contra Erika de Wet & Jure Vidmar, Conclusions, in HIERARCHY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: THE PLACE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 304 (Erika de Wet & Jure Vidmar eds., 2012).
33Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission, Joined Cases C–402/05 P and C–415/05
P 316.
34For discussion see LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE (2d ed. 1968); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey
International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997); Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90
CALIF. L. REV. 1823 (2002); and JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIK A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007).
35But see Eileen Denza, Placing the European Union in International Context: Legitimacy of the Case Law, in JUDGING
EUROPE’S JUDGES (Maurice Adams et al. eds., 2013). Pieter Jan Kuijper, “It Shall Contribute to : : : the Strict Observance
and Development of International Law : : : ”, in THE COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE: ANALYSES
AND PERSPECTIVES ON SIXTY YEARS OF CASE-LAW 611 (2013) (concluding that “[a] lot of critique has been lavished on
the Court . . . much of this critique seems exaggerated”). However, Jan Kuijper’s contribution was to the Court’s sixth anni-
versary publication of essays and one ought not to be too rude to one’s host. And he did point out that “the Court perhaps
needs to improve its treatment of binding decisions of (other) international courts and tribunals.” Id. at 611.
36MATTHIAS KOTTMANN, INTROVERTIERTE RECHTSGEMEINSCHAFT 233 (2014).
37Jack Goldsmith & Eric Posner, Does Europe Believe in International Law? Based on the record it has no grounds to criticize
the U.S., WALL STREET JOURNAL (Nov. 25, 2008), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122757164701554711 (last accessed Apr. 30,
2021).
38On treatment of the CJEU as a domestic court, see Piet Eeckhout, Community Terrorism Listings, Fundamental Rights,
and UN Security Council Resolutions: In Search of the Right Fit, 3 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 183, 196 (2007); Daniel Halberstam,
Local, Global and Plural Constitutionalism: Europe Meets the World, in THE WORLDS OF EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 198
(Gráinne de Búrca & J.H.H. Weiler eds., 2012); Allen Rosas, International Responsibility of the EU and the European Court of
Justice, in INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 159
(Malcolm Evans & Panos Koutrakos eds., 2013); Helmut Philipp Aust, Alejandro Rodiles & Peter Staubach, Unity or
Uniformity? Domestic Courts and Treaty Interpretation, 27 Leiden J. Int’l L. 75, 100 (2014).
39Etienne, supra note 18, at 2.
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is enshrined in the EU Treaties,”40 and that within the case law there is “commitment to comply
with international law and the defence of EU autonomy.”41
In accommodating this balance moving forward, Cannizzarro suggests neo-monism as a con-
cept which can “mitigate some of the consequences deriving from the supremacy of international
law.”42 de Búrca suggests a “soft constitutionalist approach . . . which does not insist on a clear
hierarchy of rules but rather on commonly negotiated and shared principles for addressing
conflict.”43 Klabbers adopts the term Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit to mean the EU respecting
international law on the international plane and to “apply it in the internal legal order if and when
appropriate.”44 In the same collection of essays Skordas responds to Klabbers. For Skordas,
Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit as comity45 functions as an ersatz meta-principle that enables the
ECJ to recognize, interpret, and implement international law and, at the same time, develop
and preserve the Union’s own separate identity. 46 Comity, Skordas states, “has a hybrid status,
oscillating between social [local] practice and a ‘sense of’ international legal obligation.”47 All of
these proposals have at their heart a balance between international law and EU law.
More precise proposals for the mechanics of this balance are also forthcoming in scholarship.
Etienne considers that the Court “has opened the doors when international law commanded so
and in turn has closed them when the integrity of essential EU acquis was at stake.” However, the
extent to which only the essential EU acquis has been protected from the application of
international law in the case law will appear below as debatable. Etienne proposes, moving forward
at least, that meta-constitutional principles of EU law should be shielded from international law.
These are, “ . . . the rules inherent to the fundaments of the European Union, providing for the
essential values on which it is founded, [and] the general principles on its institutional framework
and on its relationships with the member states and the international legal system.”48
The argument put forward implies that material, or policy, provisions of primary law are sub-
ordinate and would not form a part of this cluster.49 Martines notes that “[t]here is of course a risk
in approaching international law binding the EU selectively which can result in the very denial of
international law, if pushed too far,”50 yet, “[o]n the other hand it should also be considered that
the EU provides a way of protecting its legal order. . . .”51 One aspect of Martines’ suggestion
arguably comes very close to proportionality, “[w]hat could be called the sub-constitutional
supremacy of international law means that the incompatibility of an agreement's provision with
primary law might be a limit to the direct application of its provisions.”52
Accordingly, this proposal is more liberal in balancing EU interests than that of Etienne and
has a strong flavor of proportionality, without deploying that term. Overall, prevarication is pal-
pable in putting into print the “p word.” Eeckhout though does suggest that “general principles of
EU law, such as the principle of proportionality” are an alternative to “putting up formal obstacles,
40Odermatt, supra note 17, at 718.
41Francesca Martines, Direct Effect of International Agreements of the European Union, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 129, 144 (2014).
42Id. at 52.
43Gráinne de Búrca, The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order After Kadi, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1, 39 (2010).
44Jan Klabbers, Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit? International law and the Union Legal Order, in EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY:
LEGAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 98 (Panos Koutrakos ed., 2011).
45Contrasted with hierarchy and presented implicitly as the opposite. Id. at 116.
46Skordas, supra note 16, at 142.
47Id. at 126.
48Etienne, supra note 18, 34.
49See id. at 34 (“Meta-constitutional rules would relate to these general principles on principles of primary law, simulta-
neously overarching and providing the European Union with the essence of its constitutional structure.”). See also id. at 33 (“It
is obvious and common sense that Articles on the basic functioning of the Union do not have the same scope that material
provisions on the Union policies have.”).




such as the lack of direct effect of an international agreement.”53 “[T]he interesting suggestion [of
Eeckhout] that . . . the Court should more readily accept direct effect but show reluctance to find a
breach [of international law] where EU legislation is concerned”54 was also noted by Mendez.
These passages remain—to the author’s knowledge—the strongest endorsement of proportion-
ality proper in the application of international law in the CJEU to date.
V. Proportionality’s Place in the Literature and Potential Moving Forward
Like a missing jigsaw piece, it is submitted that proportionality fits neatly into the literature.
First, it can accommodate the aim sought by most scholars of achieving a balance between
respect for international law and protection of EU law. This balance is now more clearly encap-
sulated in the Treaties too, with Article 3(5) of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) requiring
strict observance of international law, but also that the EU uphold and promote its values and
interests.
The second way in which proportionality meets the aims of scholars is that its deployment
would place less pressure on tests for direct effect of international law, which have given rise
to the legal uncertainty to which scholars have objected. The process by which direct effect
has become an awkward locus for discretion in the absence of proportionality in external relations
case law will be further detailed below.
The third benefit of proportionality is its familiarity and durability. With the proliferation of
nomenclatures in external relations case law analyses there is the risk that scholars may speak past
one another, whereas coalescence around proportionality can provide a more solid basis for devel-
opment. Relevant elements of proportionality will be considered more fully below, but it is notable
that proportionality is durable in its application to a range of contexts—governing competence
and subsidiarity, reviewing EU and Member State action for legitimacy of aims and appropriate-
ness of measures, and even weighing interests against one another stricto sensu.55 Its application in
external relations case law could concern derogation from international law where an
international treaty confers rights on individuals, but equally, due to proportionality’s reach it
need not be limited to this. For example, in case law not applying international law the question
of direct effect does not arise concerning review of EU legislative action under Article 263 or 267 of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), permissibility of review is pre-
sumed, and the intensity of judicial review varies based on the complexity of the issue.
A fourth merit of proportionality is that of facilitating coherence with fundamental tenets of the
EU legal system. The rule of law principle from Les Verts provides that, “in a Community based on
the rule of law . . . neither [the EU’s] Member States nor its institutions can avoid a review of the
question whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity with the basic constitutional
charter, the Treaty.”56
For EU external relations law the concept of a political question doctrine is not accepted, mean-
ing that, in principle, the legislature’s action should be reviewable.57 Practically, though, without
53PIET EECKHOUT, EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS LAW 383 (2d ed. 2011).
54MENDEZ, supra note 4, at 320.
55See generally TRIDIMAS, supra note 2.
56ECJ, Case C-294/83, Parti Ecologiste Les Verts v. European Parliament, ECLI:EU:C:1986:166 (Apr. 23, 1986), para. 23,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-294/83.
57Piet Eeckhout, Does Europe’s Constitution Stop at the Water’s Edge?: Law and Policy in the EU’s External Relations, 5
WALTER VAN GERVEN LECTURES 1, 27 (2005). See also Opinion of Advocate General Maduro at paras. 34–40, ECJ,
Joined Cases C–402/05 P and C–415/05 P Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council & Comm’n, ECLI:EU:C:2008:11
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direct effect of international law the EU legislature—or less frequently Member State58—
essentially has freedom to ignore it.59 This seems in tension with the concept of international
law as an integral part of EU law and Article 3(5) TEU. Moreover, we will see that at present,
direct effect of international law precludes, in the absence of proportionality, the defense of
the legislature or Member State that pursues an objective in the Treaty which was, in the circum-
stances, more important than that of international law. Thus, international law can also, arguably,
have too great an effect and it is notable that the Council in particular has sought to exclude direct
effect from certain EU agreements.60 Proportionality can achieve review commensurate with com-
plexity of circumstance, without excluding international law nor allowing it to overpower other
EU norms. This would overcome the somewhat schizophrenic options currently available, whilst
maintaining a closer correlation with recognized precepts of EU law.
Having made the case that proportionality warrants more sustained consideration in the liter-
ature, the following sections will consider how proportionality manages the relationship between
other EU norms in internal case law. Reasons for it to be more fully and openly applied to external
relations case law will then be developed in context.
C. Judicial Discretion Manifests Itself Largely in Proportionality in Internal Case Law
Claims to direct effect are arguably the distinctive feature of the EU legal order, and as a result, cover-
age is prominent. However, direct effect sits within further rules of reliance. It is notable, though, that
all of these rules are remarkably lenient in allowing EU law to be invoked easily. Invocation of EU law
is simply the beginning in most cases and—as “EU primary law [itself] is characterized by a high
degree of vagueness and pervasive norm collision across most of its substantive areas”61—resolution
ultimately lies most frequently in the application of proportionality.
I. Decline of Direct Effect and other Rules of Reliance as a Locus of Discretion in Internal Case Law
The capability for individuals to rely on provisions of the EU Treaty against their Member State in
domestic courts, so called vertical direct effect, first emerged in the van Gend en Loos case.62
Provided the relevant provision is clear, precise, and unconditional the Member State court must
apply EU law and disapply conflicting national law.63 In Van Gend en Loos, the Court stated the
relevant provision was “ideally adapted to produce direct effects,”64 and the criteria has been lib-
erally applied to less ideal provisions since. For instance, free movement of workers “entail[s] the
right [to accept offers of employment actually made65 in another Member State], subject to lim-
itations justified on grounds of public policy, public security, or public health.”66 However, such
58See MENDEZ, supra note 4 (concerning the Court’s tendency to limit Member State action more greatly than EU legislative
action).
59Notwithstanding the weaker consequence of interpretation of EU legislation in light of non-directly effective international
agreements and continued liability at international level.
60See Ghazaryan, supra note 24, at 64–74.
61BECK, supra note 1, at 438.
62See ECJ, Case C-26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Administratie der Belastingen, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1 (Feb. 5, 1963), http://curia.
europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-26/62.
63ECJ, Case C-106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal, ECLI:EU:C:1978:49 (Mar. 9, 1978), para.
24, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-106/77.
64van Gend en Loos, Case C-26/62 at 13.
65The Court expanded the provision to allow jobseekers access to other Member States as “a strict interpretation of [Article
45(3) TFEU] would . . . make that provision ineffective.” ECJ, Case C-292/89, Antonissen, ECLI:EU:C:1991:80 (Feb. 26, 1991),
para 12, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-292/89.
66Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 45(3), May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115)
[hereinafter TFEU].
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limitations are “subject to judicial control [at EU level]”67 and therefore provisions with such con-
ditionality can have direct effect.68 Craig and de Búrca note that “[t]he idea that direct effect could
apply even where the Member States possessed discretion . . . represented a significant juridical
shift in thinking about direct effect.”69
Similarly, the Court’s focus on negative obligation in Van Gend en Loos emerged as being non-
dispositive in Lütticke.70 Here a positive obligation under The Treaty of Rome (EEC) Article 95
to repeal or amend discriminatory rules on taxation was considered “complete [and] legally
perfect”71 and therefore capable of having direct effect. The case Defrenne v. Sabena (No. 2)72
marked a relaxation of the “clear, precise and unconditional” criteria.73 The case concerned
Article 119 of the EEC Treaty which provided for the “principle that men and women should
receive equal pay for equal work.” Advocate General Trabucchi conceded that the “form of words
used . . . may seem too vague and the meaning of the word ‘principle’ itself not to be very specific”
but asserted that “the purpose of the rule is nevertheless clear.”74 The Court conceded that where
discretion was “indirect and disguised, . . . entire branches of industry and even of the economic
system as a whole” would need to be addressed and therefore required legislative measures.75
However, in this case discrimination was direct and overt, meaning direct effect could be found.
Scholars have noted the novelty in the fact that the provision “simultaneously [had] and did not
have direct effect.”76 The concept of direct effect has also expanded to include directives,77 and
even unwritten general principles of EU law may be directly effective.78
Ultimately, there is the sense that “[d]irect effect is nothing but the ordinary state of [EU]
law,”79 and it will be found wherever possible. Moreover, other rules governing reliance on
EU law are equally liberal: First, Article 258 TFEU essentially presumes the Commission’s capacity
to rely on the Treaty and any rules relating to it in order to challenge Member State action.
Member States are empowered equally, as against one another, through Article 259 TFEU.
Second, Article 263 TFEU provides a mechanism of direct judicial review before the CJEU. In
analyzing “the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies of
the Union,”80 the Court applies the Treaty and rules emanating from it, including general
67ECJ, Case C-41/74, Van Duyn v. Home Office, ECLI:EU:C:1974:133 (Dec. 4, 1974), para 7, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-41/74.
68See ECJ, Case C-2/74, Reyners v. Belgian State, ECLI:EU:C:1974:68 (June 21, 1974), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?
language=en&num=C-2/74.
69PAUL CRAIG & GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 190 (6th ed. 2015).
70ECJ, Case C-48/65, Lütticke v. Comm’n of the EEC, ECLI:EU:C:1966:8 (Mar. 1, 1966), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.
jsf?language=en&num=C-48/65.
71Id. at 210.
72ECJ, Case C-43/75, Defrenne v. Sabena, ECLI:EU:C:1976:56 (Apr. 8, 1976), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?
language=en&num=C-43/75.
73JUHA RAITIO, THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGAL CERTAINTY IN EC LAW 353 (2003); ROBERT SCHÜTZE, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 85
(2015); CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 69, at 192.
74Opinion of Advocate General Trabucchi at 486, ECJ, Case C-43/75, Defrenne v. Sabena, ECLI:EU:C:1976:39 (Mar. 10,
1976), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-43/75.
75Defrenne v. Sabena, Case C-43/75 at paras. 18–19.
76SIONAIDH DOUGLAS-SCOTT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 287 (2002). See also SCHÜTZE, supra note
73, at 85.
77Van Duyn v. Home Office, Case C-41/74 at 1337.
78ECJ, Case C-260/89, Elliniki Radiophonia Tileorassi AE v. Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis, ECLI:EU:C:1991:254 (June 18,
1991), para 24, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-260/89.
79Pierre Pescatore, The Doctrine of Direct Effect: An Infant Disease of Community Law, 8 EUR. L. REV. 155, 177 (1983).
See also DOUGLAS-SCOTT, supra note 76, at 287; ATHONY ARNULL, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS COURT OF JUSTICE
157–79 (2d ed. 2006); Bruno de Witte, Direct Effect, Primacy and the Nature of the Legal Order, in THE EVOLUTION OF
EU LAW 334 (Paul Craig & Gráinne de Búrca eds., 2d ed. 2011); and SCHÜTZE, supra note 73, at 87.
80TFEU art. 267(1)(b).
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principles,81 regardless of whether they have direct effect.82 Controversy regarding limited stand-
ing for EU institutions under Article 263 TFEU has now been addressed, meaning that they, along
with Member States, may challenge EU legislation without questions of direct effect arising.
Private individuals must demonstrate that the act is of direct and individual concern to them,
with the interpretation of this criteria being narrow.83 Minor changes in the language of the pro-
vision in the Lisbon Treaty do not appear to have significantly affected this.84 However, if an indi-
vidual does not fulfil the restrictive criteria of Article 263 TFEU they may proceed through the
preliminary rulings procedure.
Third, under Article 267 TFEU, preliminary rulings procedure, if the matter concerns the val-
idity of EU legislation the national court’s question, it will prompt the CJEU to answer and to
invalidate the legislation should this be required, regardless of direct effect.85
In all the instances above, the question as to whether a specific provision has direct effect is not
enquired into: For Articles 258, 259, 263, and this aspect of Article 267 TFEU. However, under
Article 267 TFEU, cases brought by individuals against Member States and private individuals will
require direct effect of the relevant provision; otherwise the provision may only be useful in the
more limited capacity of interpreting another EU and/or national law provision.86 Although, as
noted above, the test for direct effect is itself generous.
The presumption, where relevant, of direct effect of EU legal provisions, combined with other
rules which permit reliance creates a large opening, catches and then funnels cases through to the
proportionality stage. It is submitted that proportionality—not direct effect—is the primary locus
of the Court’s discretion in internal case law. The impact and practical application of this can now
be considered.
II. Corresponding Rise of Proportionality as a Locus of Discretion in Internal Case Law
With direct effect and other related rules invariably allowing reliance on EU law provisions, cases
must then progress to consider their application. While EU law features a hierarchy in which we
identify the EU Treaty as sitting above secondary legislation and secondary legislation above
national law,87 it is submitted that this hierarchy is not especially informative regarding the res-
olution of most cases. Instead, the normative interest—pursued at any level of the hierarchy—is
postulated at the EU treaty level, where multiple norms conflict and must be resolved through
proportionality.
81See TRIDIMAS, supra note 2, at 36.
82Morten Broberg & Niels Fenger, PRELIMINARY REFERENCES TO THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 213–22 (2010).
83For the general approach, see ECJ, Case C-25/62, Plaumann & Co. v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:C:1963:17 (July 15, 1963), http://
curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-25/62. But see F. Jacobs, Access by Individuals to Judicial Review in EU
Law – Still an Issue of Concern?, in EUROPE: THE NEW LEGAL REALISM - ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HJALTE RASMUSSEN 263–76
(H. Koch et al. eds., 2010), who discusses having previously advocated a broader interpretation in his role as Advocate General
in ECJ, Case C-50/00 P, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:2002:462 (July 25, 2002), http://curia.europa.
eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-50/00, which was followed by a similar approach in the General Court but rejected on
appeal by the Court of Justice in ECJ, Case C-263/02 P, Comm’n v. Jégo-Quéré, ECLI:EU:C:2004:210 (Apr. 1, 2004), http://
curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-263/02.
84ECJ, Case C-583/11 P, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v. Parliament and Council, ECLI:EU:C:2013:625 (Oct. 3, 2013),
paras. 55, 70, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-583/11. See also Carl Fredrik Bergström, Defending
Restricted Standing for Individuals to Bring Direct Actions Against “Legislative”Measures, 10 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 481 (2014).
85For this reason, it is said not to be between parties stricto sensu. See BROBERG & FENGER, supra note 82, at 351. A limitation
is that the question must be relevant for the national court to decide the case before it. See ECJ, Case C-104/79, Foglia v.
Novello, ECLI:EU:C:1980:73 (Mar. 11, 1980), paras. 9–13, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-104/79.
86So-called indirect effect.
87See, e.g., ALLEN ROSAS & LORNA ARMATI, EU CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 42 (2010).
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Proportionality arises in challenges to EU legislation and Member State action, essentially
allowing defense of such actions through, in the case of the former, pursuit of another justified
goal and, in the latter, recourse to derogations within the Treaty and those developed within the
case law. The application of the proportionality test is noted to differ significantly depending upon
whether EU or Member State action is challenged. The Court’s approach and presentation of rel-
evant steps within proportionality analyses are also not consistently presented.88
Nonetheless, the common steps for the Court in proportionality analyses are inquiries as to89:
i. Whether the aim is recognized as legitimate by EU law.
ii. Whether the measure was suitable to achieve the desired end.
iii. Whether it was necessary to achieve the desired end.
iv. Whether the burden was excessive in relation to the objective sought to be achieved,
proportionality stricto sensu.
It can be seen through this that proportionality requires, or at least facilitates, engagement with
the facts and circumstances of a given case in a concrete way.
III. Proportionality Applied to EU Action
As hinted at above, a key modification to the proportionality test comes where EU secondary
legislation is reviewed, as it often need not solely be manifestly disproportionate, or inappropriate,
whereas Member State action should typically adopt the least restrictive means available.90 The
distinction results in deference to the EU legislature where it is exercising discretion, though
Member State action is subject to more intense review.91
The consequence of a lighter touch review of EU secondary legislation, as compared to intru-
sive analysis of Member State measures, is that case law reviewing EU action will also be less help-
ful in informing participants of the current normative state of EU law for this or future cases.92
Nonetheless, “the Community legislature is obliged to base its choice on objective criteria appro-
priate to the aim pursued by the legislation in question,” including consideration of all facts and
technical and scientific data available.93 All interests involved must be considered, and “the
Community legislature’s exercise of its discretion must not produce results that are manifestly
less appropriate than those that would be produced by other measures that were also suitable
for those objectives.”94 This means that both the outcome and the procedure are subject to review.
88Wolf Sauter, Proportionality in EU Law: A Balancing Act?, 15 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. STUD. 439, 448 (2013).
89See in combination, ECJ, Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano, ECLI:
EU:C:1995:411 (Nov. 30, 1995), para 37, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-55/94, and ECJ, Case
C-110/05, Comm’n v. Italy, ECLI:EU:C:2009:66 (Feb. 10, 2009), para 59, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=
en&num=C-110/05, and ECJ, Case C-112/00, Schmidberger, ECLI:EU:C:2003:333 (June 12, 2003), para 79, http://curia.
europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-112/00.
90A recent exception to this came in a line of case law showing tolerance of Member States adopting “easily managed and
supervised” measures even if they were not the least restrictive means available. See, e.g., Commission v. Italy, Case C-110/05;
ECJ, Case C-142/05, Åklagaren v. Mickelsson and Roos, ECLI:EU:C:2009:336 (June 4, 2009), para. 36, http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-142/05; ECJ, Case C-137/09, Josemans, ECLI:EU:C:2010:774 (Dec. 16, 2010), para. 82,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-142/05; and ECJ, Case C-512/13, Sopora, ECLI:EU:C:2015:108
(Feb. 24, 2015), para 33, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-512/13.
91See, e.g., BECK, supra note 1, at 422; SYBE A. DE VRIES, TENSIONS WITHIN THE INTERNAL MARKET: THE FUNCTIONING OF
THE INTERNAL MARKET AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HORIZONTAL FLANKING POLICIES 16 (2006); CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra
note 69, at 532.
92Sauter, supra note 88, at 464–65.
93ECJ, Case C-127/07, Société Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine and Others v. Premier Minister, ECLI:EU:C:2008:728 (Dec.
16, 2008), para. 58, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-127/07.
94Id. at para. 59.
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A further variation arises within proportionality review of EU action based on the nature of the
conflicting rights. It is recognized that where a fundamental right is at stake, rather than a discre-
tionary policy choice, the review of EU legislative action will be based on protecting the substance
of the relevant right, and for this reason can be more intrusive.95 Proportionality and the nature of
fundamental rights is developed further below. However, it should be noted that fundamental
rights are readily balanced against other interests in review of both EU and Member State action.
IV. Proportionality Applied to Member State Action
As stated at the introduction, proportionality is relevant in most areas of EU law. However,
consideration of internal market case law is particularly helpful in identifying the normatively
relative—less hierarchical—nature of EU law, as other norms are often measured against the four
fundamental freedoms.96 Another notable point is that, in this case law, these “other” norms
manifest themselves in national rules creating barriers to free movement, and the hierarchical
place of national law—at the very bottom—does not preclude their normative weight as interests
recognized as being of importance in EU law. Once recognized as such, provided the measure was
appropriate and necessary, the Court can consider whether the restriction on trade, or another
norm, was excessive in relation to the objective sought to be achieved—proportionality stricto
sensu. Even where the Court does not balance norms against one another stricto sensu, which
it is sometimes reluctant to do unless prompted, it is recognized that the relevant norms also affect
the intrusiveness of tests of appropriateness and necessity.97 For this reason, the term “balance” is
used liberally by scholars, and this is also the case here.
A snapshot of case law, therefore, reveals that, inter alia, protection of health can be more
important than free movement of goods,98 as can public morality.99 Of course, these feature as
express derogations in Article 36 TFEU, but environmental protection,100 fundamental rights,101
and consumer protection102 have the capacity to prevail similarly. The protection of norms
beyond the closed-list of Article 36 TFEU illustrates the Court’s inclination to entertain clashes
between norms, even when previous case law would have implied that this was not possible.103 The
Court’s inclination to balance is strong, and it is not only the free movement norms—or “trade”
norms—against which others are balanced, this is just the most prominent area of practice. By way
of brief example, fundamental rights are frequently balanced against the public interest104—or
95PAUL CRAIG, EU ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 656–63 (3d ed. 2018).
96Loïc Azoulai, The European Court of Justice and the Duty to Respect Sensitive National Interests, in JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AT
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 168 (Mark Dawson, Bruno de Witte & Elise Muir eds., 2013).
97See Harbo, supra note 13, at 172; CRAIG, supra note 95, at 653–54.
98ECJ, Case C-24/00, Commission v. France, ECLI:EU:C:2004:70 (Feb. 5, 2004), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?
language=en&num=C-24/00.
99ECJ, Case C-34/79, Regina v. Henn and Darby, ECLI:EU:C:1979:295 (Dec. 14, 1979), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?
language=en&num=C-34/79.
100ECJ, Case C-379/98, PreussenElektra v. Schleswag AG, ECLI:EU:C:2001:160 (Mar. 13, 2001), http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-379/98.
101See, e.g., Schmidberger, Case C-112/00.
102See, e.g., ECJ, Case C-313/94, Graffione v. Ditta Fransa, ECLI:EU:C:1996:450 (Nov. 26, 1996), http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-313/94.
103For instance, in PreussenElektra, Case C-379/98, the national measure appeared discriminatory but was still justified as a
mandatory requirement (environmental protection), which in the Court’s case law had hitherto only been available only to
non-discriminatory measures.
104See, e.g., ECJ, Case C-4/73, Nold KG v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:C:1975:114 (Sep. 24, 1975), para. 14, http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-4/73; ECJ, Case C-11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, ECLI:EU:C:1970:114 (Dec.
17, 1970), para. 24, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-11/70; ECJ, Case C-44/79, Hauer v. Land
Rheinland-Pfalz, ECLI:EU:C:1979:290 (Dec. 13, 1979), para. 23, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=
C-44/79.
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even public health—105and equal treatment has been balanced against environmental protec-
tion.106 The necessity of balancing is inherent in the postulation of multiple norms at the same
level—EU treaty and general principle—which means that the Court frequently must “strike a
‘balance’” between competing “integrated” values.107 This reality marks the decline of hierarchy
and the corresponding rise of proportionality in internal case law.
This also affects the nature of the norms themselves and, by extension, the EU legal system in
which norms are accorded relative—rather than intrinsic—weight. Accordingly, restrictions to
fundamental rights must “not constitute, with regard to the aim pursued, disproportionate
and unreasonable interference undermining the very substance of that right.”108 This means that
such rights are not “absolute prerogatives,”109 but may have an “essence” or “very substance,”
which suggests a hardening at their center, although the precise scope of this varies and is
unclear.110 This flexibility is perhaps appropriate given the proliferation of fundamental rights—
some of vital importance, but some covering even “the most mundane matters.”111 Ultimately,
albeit with stricter review from the Court, fundamental rights have a “relational character”112
and the Court readily balances them against other norms,113 essentially seeking a “fair balance
between them.”114 Thus, “[t]here is no distinction and hence no hierarchical relationship being
posited by the European Court between the basic human rights . . . and the free market rights.”115
Instead, human rights are subject to “the interpretative practice of balancing to reconcile the com-
peting rights and interests.”116
Similarly, concerning trade liberalization and consumer protection, Weatherill observes “many
delicate cases” in which “[j]udges must decide which interest prevails – and why,”117 with pro-
portionality analyses facilitating the “sensitive task of adjudication without any intricate set of
guidance or hierarchy mapped by the founding Treaties.”118 Ultimately, “the Court makes a
radical choice on a case-by-case basis . . . radical in the sense that there are no overarching criteria
that provide a rational basis for preferring one value to another.”119 Properly applied, however, it
has also been suggested that “[b]alancing offers the best possible predictability in a flexible
105ECJ, Case C-544/10, Deutsches Weintor eG v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, ECLI:EU:C:2012:526 (Sep. 6, 2012), http://curia.
europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-544/10.
106Société Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine and Others, Case C-127/07.
107Rainer Nickel, From Integration Through Law to Integration Through Conflict, in ‘INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW’
REVISITED: THE MAKING OF THE EUROPEAN POLITY 121 (Daniel Augenstein ed., 2012).
108See, e.g., ECJ, Case C-292/97, Karlsson and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2000:202 (Apr. 13, 2000), para. 45, http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-292/97; ECJ, Case C–280/93, Ger. v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:1994:367 (Oct. 5, 1994), para.
73, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-280/93; ECJ, Case C-265/87, Schräder v. Hauptzollamt
Gronau, ECLI:EU:C:1989:303 (July 11, 1989), para. 15, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-265/87;
ECJ, Case C-5/88, Wachauf v. Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft, ECLI:EU:C:1989:321 (July 13, 1989), para
18, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-5/88.
109Steve Peers, Taking Rights Away? Limitations and Derogations, in THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS:
POLITICS, LAW AND POLICY 143 (Steve Peers & Angela Ward eds., 2004).
110PAUL CRAIG, EU ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 680 (1st ed. 2006).
111Mattias Kumm, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, Nold and the New Human Rights Paradigm, in THE PAST AND
FUTURE OF EU LAW: THE CLASSICS OF EU LAW REVISITED ON THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ROME TREATY 107
(Miguel Poiares Maduro & Loïc Azoulai eds., 2010). See particularly Deutsches Weintor eG, Case C-544/10.
112Marton Varju, European Union Human Rights Law: The Dynamics of Interpretation and Context (Edward Elgar 2014)
263.
113See BECK, supra note 1, at 178.
114See, e.g., Deutsches Weintor eG, Case C-544/10, at para. 47.
115Jason Coppel and Aidan O’Neill, ‘The European Court of Justice: taking rights seriously?’ (1992) 29(4) CommonMarket
Law Review 669 cited in Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, Constitutional Law of the European Union (Pearson 2002) 457.
116MARTON VARJU, EUROPEAN UNION HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: THE DYNAMICS OF INTERPRETATION AND CONTEXT 264
(2014).
117STEPHEN WEATHERILL, EU CONSUMER LAW AND POLICY 308 (2d ed. 2014).
118Id.
119See BECK, supra note 1, at 178.
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jurisdiction. [As] [a]ll conflicting interests are taken into account clearly and openly in every single
case.”120
Schmidberger—concerning protests limiting free movement of goods—is a helpful example of
this. There, the Court stated that “the interests involved must be weighed having regard to all the
circumstances of the case in order to determine whether a fair balance was struck between those
interests.”121 In comparing the protest in Schmidberger to the protest in Spanish Strawberries122—
which was found to have “serious and repeated disruptions to public order”123—the Court was
able to indicate the factors that contributed to the Schmidberger protest being justified, identifying
the “various administrative and supporting measures [that] were taken by the competent author-
ities in order to limit as far as possible the disruption to road traffic.”124
V. Reflections on Proportionality Internally
In spite of many variables—based on actor, subject matter, nature of right, and changing weight of
norm—harsh critics of proportionality within the EU remain few in number.125 Instead, there is
recognition by most that proportionality can mitigate the harshness of supremacy coupled with
direct effect from the Member State point of view,126 in addition to providing meaningful review of
EU action.127 It can also be seen that even where loosely or partially followed, the common steps of
proportionality will prompt the Court—in what is undeniably a complex and developing legal
system—to at least be somewhat forthcoming concerning its reasoning, and to engage with
the facts and circumstances of the case in a concrete way.
With direct effect invariably granted—and often not being required128—it is evident that dis-
cretion in internal case law manifests itself primarily through proportionality, that the EU legal
order is emerging as non-hierarchical in practice, and that the Court has a key role in incremen-
tally developing the relevant norms.129 These factors carry implications for external relations case
law, as can now be explored.
D. Emergence of Discretion by Means Other than Proportionality in External Relations
Case Law Due to its Significant Absence
I. Inevitability of Discretion: Proportionality’s Shadow in External Relations Case Law
As noted at the introduction, proportionality analyses are very largely absent in external rela-
tions case law.130 Instead, there is the purport of a formalistic hierarchy, in which international
law is mechanically applied in external relations case law in situations where it has direct effect.
However, having had a prominent role in developing norms incrementally in internal
120MATTHIAS KLATT & MORITZ MEISTER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF PROPORTIONALITY 32 (2012).
121Id. at para. 81.
122ECJ, Case C-265/95, Comm’n v. France, ECLI:EU:C:1997:595 (Dec. 9, 1997), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?
language=en&num=C-265/95.
123Id. at para. 88.
124Id. at para. 87
125But see Harbo, supra note 13, at 158–85.
126Sauter, supra note 88, at 464.
127CRAIG, supra note 95, at 647.
128See, e.g., TFEU arts. 258, 259, 263, 267 when questioning the validity of EU legislation.
129Environmental protection is a notable example and causes scholars to question whether prominent EU environmental
law case law from the 1980s would be decided similarly today. See STUART BELL, DONALD MCGILLIVRAY & OLE PEDERSEN,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 225 (8th ed. 2013). See also ELINA PAUNIO, LEGAL CERTAINTY IN MULTILINGUAL EU LAW: LANGUAGE,
DISCOURSE AND REASONING AT THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 87–94 (2013).
130For exceptions, see infra, Section D(III)(3).
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case law,131 the following question remains: Is it to be expected that the Court will eschew
the norms developed in its internal case law when applying international law in external
relations cases?
The Court’s refusal to permit its members to sit on any newly created international court in
Opinion 1/91132 was based on its view that “it will be very difficult, if not impossible, for those
judges, when sitting in the Court of Justice, to tackle questions with completely open minds where
they have taken part in determining those questions as members of the EEA Court.”133 However,
the converse must hold, and even more strongly. The Court cannot be expected to disavow its
normative conceptions and mechanically apply international provisions to invalidate EU law.
Indeed, the idea that courts have the capacity to “split roles,” so that “any time a domestic court
deals with a conflict of law question, it acts qua an international body,”134 has recently been
described as “overly optimistic”135 and “shaky.”136
The external relations case law analyzed below is strong evidence that the Court is not able to
divide its internal function from its role in applying international law. Instead, modified rules of
reliance and application seek to alleviate the absence of proportionality in external relations case
law so as to protect EU norms from international law. Setting aside the fact that “it is by no means
clear that a neatly defined hierarchy is always the best way of resolving conflicts within a legal
system,”137 it is true that a strict hierarchy, mechanically enforced, would give rise to greater legal
certainty than would balancing competing norms through proportionality.138 However, as we
shall now see, this is no longer the case in external relations case law.
Unsurprisingly, normative concerns have permeated the strict hierarchy. We will see that the
direct effect test is modified relentlessly, autonomy is claimed—on unclear bases and with varied
effects, and interpretative methods emerge as questionable concerning international treaty and
customary international law (CIL). This though, it will be seen, falls a long way short of propor-
tionality, in which “[a]ll conflicting interests are taken into account clearly and openly in every
single case.”139 Instead, we have the worst of both worlds: Neither a strict hierarchy nor propor-
tionality, but rather discretion exercised covertly through supposedly mechanical rules. The result
is a lack of nuanced balance and loss of legal certainty.
Whilst proportionality would not overcome the reality that domestic judges, either through
issues of competence, confidence, or allegiance, are more likely to favor domestic methods or
viewpoints, the benefits of its application to this area would be significant.140 Following the analy-
sis on external relations case law we will be better placed to understand the modest means by
which proportionality could be deployed. Indeed, in some cases it already has been. It should also
be mentioned that the proposal to deploy proportionality in external relations case law is not lim-
ited to those agreements which have direct effect currently. Instead, it would be anticipated that
access to proportionality for the Court will lessen the need for narrow distinctions within direct
131On the collaborative development of norms by the Court and legislature, see Phil Syrpis, Theorising the Relationship
Between the Judiciary and the Legislature in the EU Internal Market, in THE JUDICIARY, THE LEGISLATURE AND THE EU
INTERNAL MARKET (Phil Syrpis ed., 2012).
132Opinion 1/91, Re Agreement on the European Economic Area, 1994 ECR I-6079.
133Id. at paras. 51–52.
134Antonio Cassese, Remarks on Scelle’s Theory of “Role Splitting” (dédoublement fonctionnel) in International Law, 1 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 210, 213 (1990).
135Halberstam, supra note 38, at 197.
136See NOLLKAEMPER, supra note 27, at 47. See also Aust, Rodiles & Staubach, supra note 38, at 111.
137LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 112 (1969).
138Compare, for example, the narrow, hierarchical, mechanical approach in MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 886
(Guenther Ross & Claus Wittich eds., 1978), with the Herculean, all-encompassing, but less certain approach in RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, 245 (1986).
139KLATT & MEISTER, supra note 120, at 32.
140See infra, Section D(V).
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effect, thus mirroring more fully the internal approach with a more ready acceptance of direct
effect where needed and subsequent application of proportionality.141
II. Manifestations of Discretion in External Relations Case Law I: Modifications to Direct
Effect-Related Rules in the Absence of Proportionality
1. Discretion Through Wider Application of Direct Effect Tests in External Relations Case Law
In spite of distinguishing EU law as a “new legal order of international law” uniquely capable of
direct effect in Van Gend en Loos, in International Fruit,142 the Court confirmed that provisions of
“old” international law could also have direct effect in the EU. Though relatively receptive of
international law, this case already marked a divergence from the equivalent scope of application
of internal direct effect. As above, we have seen that in Article 267 TFEU cases calling into ques-
tion validity of EU legislation, direct effect of relevant rules is not required, whereas in
International Fruit it was.
However, in Haegeman II,143 the Court reviewed the Commission’s imposition of a “counter-
vailing charge” on the basis of an Association Agreement with Greece. The case was also an Article
267 TFEU referral, and the Court utilized for the first time the oft-cited phrase that “[t]he pro-
visions of [an international] agreement, from the coming into force thereof, form an integral part
of Community law.”144 This expression was particularly fitting as the Court did not enquire into
direct effect at all, which matched with the internal approach. However, the case has become an
anomaly, and direct effect appears to be required before international law can be relied upon to
invalidate EU legislation in Article 267 TFEU actions.
It also emerged that even privileged applicants under Article 263 TFEU—such as the Member
States—cannot rely on international agreements to which the EU is party to challenge EU legis-
lative action, unless that provision is directly effective.145 In this light, it is worthy of mention that
the Commission’s capacity to rely on international agreements to which the EU is party in 258
TFEU enforcement actions against Member States is uncircumscribed—matching the approach in
internal case law.146 This gives rise to some asymmetry.
However, in Biotechnological Inventions, an Article 263 TFEU case, the Court stated that147:
Even if . . . the [Convention on Biological Diversity] contains provisions which do not have
direct effect . . . that fact does not preclude review by the courts of compliance with the obli-
gations incumbent on the Community as a party to that agreement.
This matches with the internal approach in which challenges to EU action are readily enter-
tained. Eeckhout has speculated that the reason for departure from previous external relations case
law may be “that the Court felt embarrassed by the incapacity of the Member States to seek judicial
review [of EU legislation] on grounds of violation of certain [international] agreements.”148
However, Eeckhout forewarned that this approach may not continue, and Pavoni notes that
141This also reflects the suggestions of Eeckhout and Mendez concerning reform of external relations case law, considered
above, supra Section B(IV).
142See ECJ, Joined Cases C-21 to 24/72, International Fruit Company and Others v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit,
ECLI:EU:C:1972:115 (Dec. 12, 1972), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-21/72.
143Haegeman, Case C-181/73.
144Id. at para. 5.
145See, e.g., Germany v. Council, Case C–280/93; ECJ, Case C-149/96, Portugal v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:1999:574 (Nov. 23,
1999), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-149/96.
146ECJ, Case C-61/94, Comm’n v. Germany, ECLI:EU:C:1996:313 (Sep. 10, 1996), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?
language=en&num=C-61/94.
147ECJ, Case C-377/98, Netherlands v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:C:2001:523 (Oct. 9, 2001), paras. 54–56, http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-377/98.
148EECKHOUT, supra note 53, at 297–98.
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“it appears that the Court of Justice is willing to duck the Biotech Patents decision, which has
never been endorsed in its subsequent jurisprudence on external relations.”149 And, in spite of
encouragement by Advocate General Jääskinen, the Court was not inclined to utilize it more
recently.150
The above demonstrates oscillations concerning the requirement for direct effect externally in
Article 263 and 267 TFEU cases; a requirement which is not present in internal case law.
Accordingly, direct effect, at the Court’s discretion, has a potentially wider application than in
internal case law. There are also significant oscillations in the application of the direct effect test
itself externally, which will now be considered.
2. Discretion Through Elusive Terms: Broad Scope and Logic/Spirit or Nature of Agreement
In International Fruit,151 the Court stated that152:
Before invalidity can be relied upon before a national court, that provision of international
law must also be capable of conferring rights on citizens of the Community which they can
invoke before the courts.
The Court then explained that “the spirit, the general scheme and the terms of the general
agreement must be considered” in order to answer this question.153 The words “spirit” or “nature”
provide potentially elusive benchmarks, and therefore “the CJEU’s discretion in applying these
criteria is high and requires an amount of subjectivity.”154 Similar formulations have been used
by the Court since. These tended not to utilize the conferral of rights criteria expressly, instead
replacing it with analysis of the “wording and the purpose and nature”155 of agreements, which is
equally elusive.
It is well known that the Court’s case law concerning, first, General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), and second, World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements, resulted in the blan-
ket exclusion of direct effect of these treaties based on their “broad scope and logic.”156 In
International Fruit, the Court refused direct effect of GATT due to its flexible nature. The
149R. Pavoni, Controversial Aspects of the Interaction Between International and EU Law in Environmental Matters: Direct
Effect and Member States’ Unilateral Measures, in THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 351
(Elisa Morgera ed., 2012).
150Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen at para. 10, ECJ, Joined Cases C-404 & 405/12 P, Council and Comm’n v.
Stichting Natuur en Milieu and Pesticide Action Network Europe, ECLI:EU:C:2014:309 (May 8, 2014), http://curia.
europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-404/12.
151International Fruit Company, Joined Cases C-21 to 24/72.
152Id. at para. 8.
153Id. at para. 20.
154Szilárd Gáspár-Szilágyi, EU International Agreements Through a US Lens: Different Methods of Interpretation, Tests and
the Issue of “Rights”, 39 EUR. L. REV. 601, 615 (2014).
155See ECJ, Case C-12/86, Demirel v. Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd, ECLI:EU:C:1987:400 (Sep. 30, 1987), para 14, http://curia.
europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-12/86. See also ECJ, Case C-213/03, Syndicat Professionnel Coordination des
Pêcheurs de l'Etang de Berre et de la Region v. Électricité de France, ECLI:EU:C:2004:464 (July 15, 2004), para. 39, http://curia.
europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-213/03; ECJ, Case C-171/01, Wählergruppe "Gemeinsam Zajedno/Birlikte
Alternative und Grüne GewerkschafterInnen/UG", and Bundesminister für Wirtschaft und Arbeit and Others, ECLI:EU:
C:2003:260 (May 8, 2003), para. 54, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-171/01.
156The debate over the merits of this position has been intense. For a defense of the jurisprudence of the Court, see, for
example, S. Griller, Judicial Enforceability of WTO Law in the European Union: Annotation to Case C-149/96, Portugal v
Council, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 441 (2000); Piet Eeckhout, Judicial Enforcement of WTO Law in the European Union – Some
Further Reflections, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 91 (2002); MENDEZ, supra note 4, at 174–249. For criticism, see, for example,
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Can the EU’s Disregard for “Strict Observance of International Law” (Article 3 TEU) Be
Constitutionally Justified?, in TRADE AND COMPETITION LAW IN THE EU AND BEYOND (Inge Govaere, Reinhard Quick &
Marco Bronckers eds., 2011); Nikos Lavranos, The ECJ’s Relationship with Other International Courts and Tribunals, in
EUROPE: THE NEW LEGAL REALISM - ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HJALTE RASMUSSEN (Henning Koch et al. eds., 2010).
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subsequent WTO agreement was viewed as carrying more concrete obligations. However, in
Portuguese Textiles, the Court refused to accept that it could have direct effect.157 Whilst the
Court accepted that the WTO agreement did “differ significantly . . . in particular by reason
of the strengthening of the system of safeguards and the mechanism for resolving disputes.”158
It added immediately that “the system resulting from those agreements nevertheless accords con-
siderable importance to negotiation between the parties.”159 The Court made reference, in passing,
to the preamble and to annexes too,160 the former of which led the Court to focus on aspects of
reciprocity. It noted that it was unlike agreements between the EU and other non-member coun-
tries “which introduce a certain asymmetry of obligations or create special relations of integration
with the Community.”161 It also went on to observe that “some of the contracting parties, which
are among the most important commercial partners of the community” had not considered the
rules to be “applicable by their judicial organs when reviewing the legality of their rules of domes-
tic law.”162
However, in Kupferberg, the Court broadly asserted that a “framework for consultations and
negotiations between the parties inter se . . . is not in itself sufficient to exclude all judicial appli-
cation of it.”163 This was because case concerned a Free Trade Agreement with Portugal,164 and
may therefore be thought to be rather different from WTO law. Indeed, Eeckhout notes that con-
cerning “direct effect of free-trade, co-operation, and association agreements the Court has never
decided against direct effect on the basis of the structure and nature of the agreement as such.”165
Klabbers similarly observes of Kupferberg that “[d]irect effect within one of the parties’ legal sys-
tem but not within the other’s would not, e.g., constitute a fatal lack of reciprocity.”166
Of course, the reality is that reciprocity is being used as an inconvenient proxy, enabling covert
differentiation on the basis of the trading partner. But this creates confusion. Indeed, in Kupferberg
itself, Advocate General Rozès, unlike the Court, thought that direct effect should not be granted
as it would be to the Community’s “disadvantage” where Portugal did not “guarantee that an indi-
vidual may rely on the provision in Portugal on the same terms and with the same results.”167
Once more, discretion emerges.
3. Discretion Through Selective Adherence to Binding Decisions of Bodies Established Under Agreements
The “remarkable phenomenon”168 in which decisions of bodies established by international agree-
ments could have direct effect was established in Sevince.169 This case concerned the EU-Turkey
Association Agreement,170 which was found in Demirel not to have direct effect as it set out a
157Portugal v. Council, Case C-149/96.
158Id. at para. 47.
159Id. at para. 47.
160Id. at para. 42.
161Id.
162Id. at para. 44.
163ECJ, Case C-104/81, Hauptzollamt Mainz v. CA Kupferberg, ECLI:EU:C:1982:362 (Oct. 26, 1982), para. 20, http://curia.
europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-104/81.
164Agreement Concluded on 22 July 1972 Between the European Economic Community and the Portuguese Republic, 1972
O.J. SPEC. ED. 167.
165EECKHOUT, supra note 53, at 338.
166Jan Klabbers, International Law in Community Law: The Law and Politics of Direct Effect, 21 Y.B. EUR. L. 263, 282
(2001).
167Opinion of Advocate General Rozès, Case C-104/81, Hauptzollamt Mainz v. CA Kupferberg (Oct. 26, 1982).
168Marc Maresceau, Bilateral Agreements Concluded by the European Community, 309 COLLECTED COURSES HAGUE ACAD.
INT’L L. 125, 295 (2004).
169ECJ, Case C-192/89, S.Z. Sevince v. Staatssecretaris Van Justitie, ECLI:EU:C:1990:322 (Sept. 20, 1990), https://curia.
europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-192/89.
170Council Directive of December 29, 1964, Establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and
Turkey, 1977 O.J. (L. 361) 29 (EC).
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“programme . . . not sufficiently precise and unconditional to be capable of governing directly
the free movement of workers.”171 However, in Demirel, the Court referred to Decision 1/80
of the Council of Association, which had been given “exclusive powers to lay down detailed rules”
for the functioning of the agreement.172 The Decision was not relevant to the case at hand, but in
referring to it, the Court implied that such Decisions would be determinative in future cases. In
Sevince, the Court found that the programmatic nature of the EU-Turkey Association
Agreement,173 which gave the Council of Association power to lay down detailed rules for its func-
tioning, “does not prevent . . . decisions . . . which give effect in specific respects to the programmes
envisaged . . . from having direct effect.”174 Accordingly, Decision 2/76 and 1/80 could have direct
effect, a finding that was said to “merely lay emphasis on the obligation to implement in good faith
an international Agreement.”175
The conditionality ofWTO obligations will be recalled as being a central tenet in the precluding
of direct effect in Portuguese Textiles.176 The WTO dispute settlement procedure’s binding nature
is also debated.177 Article 19 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) says that the panel
(DSB) or Appellate Body “shall recommend that a Member concerned bring the measure into
conformity” in the case of a breach or that the relevant body “may suggest ways in which the
Member could implement the recommendations.” Article 22(2) DSU provides that in the event
of non-compliance a “Member shall . . . enter into negotiations with any party having invoked the
dispute settlement procedures, with a view to developing mutually acceptable compensation.”
Article 21 DSU though speaks of “prompt compliance” being “essential” to the system.
“Compensation [by the Member in breach] and suspension of other obligations [by Members
harmed]” are considered to be “temporary” alternatives in the event of non-compliance and
“neither compensation nor the suspension of concessions or other obligations is preferred to full
implementation of a recommendation to bring a measure into conformity with the covered agree-
ments.”178 Article 3(7) DSU supports this further by stating that “compensation should be
resorted to only if the immediate withdrawal of the measure is impracticable and as a temporary
measure.” Could this clear postulation of a hierarchical preference for compliance179 render a DSB
or Panel recommendation directly effective in the EU legal system given the “good faith” in imple-
mentation of international law referred to in Sevince?
The Biret180 case appeared to leave the door open to such a possibility.181 A negative DSB find-
ing was made in 1997 concerning the EU’s banning of certain substances being administered to
farm animals.182 Though the case was unsuccessful, the reasoning of the Court was very much
171ECJ, Case 12/86, Meryem Demirel v. Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd, ECLI:EU:C:1987:400 (Sept. 30, 1987), para. 23, https://
curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&jur=C,T,F&num=C-12/86&td=ALL.
172See Meryem Demirel, Case 12/86 at para. 21.
173Council Directive of 29 December 1964, Establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and
Turkey, 1977 O.J. (L. 361) 29 (EC).
174See Sevince, Case C-192/89 at para. 21.
175Id. at para. 23.
176ECJ, Case C-149/96, Portugal v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:1999:574 (Nov. 23, 1999), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?
language=en&num=C-149/96.
177See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU]. For a close analysis
of the WTO case law see Petros C. Mavroidis, Remedies in the WTO Legal System: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 11(4)
EUR. J. INT’L. L. 763 (2000).
178See DSU art. 22.
179Eeckhout suggests that, after a breach has been “authoritatively” found by the Dispute Settlement Body, there is “a vio-
lation of the DSU provisions requiring compliance” and that, “[a]ll this is quite serious.” See Eeckhout, supra note 57, at 27.
180ECJ, Case C-93/02P, Biret International SA v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:2003:517, (Sept. 30, 2003), https://curia.europa.eu/
juris/liste.jsf?language=en&jur=C,T,F&num=c-93/02&td=ALL.
181Mario Mendez, The Impact of WTO Rulings in the Community Legal Order, 29 EUR. L. REV. 517, 529 (2004); ANNE THEIS,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE DISPUTES AND EU LIABILITY 27 (2013).
182The substance ban included certain hormonal supplements and all substances having thyrostatic action.
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focused on the “timeline.” As will be seen below, where the EU intends to implement WTO law, a
review of secondary legislation on its basis can occur.183 However, because the relevant Union
legislation was adopted “several years before” the WTO rules came into force, it was “not logically
possible for them either to give rise to a specific obligation entered into under that agreement or to
refer expressly to some of its provisions.”184 As to the breach of the DSB recommendation, the
Court observed that a grace period had been provided until May 13, 1999. As the applicant’s losses
fell within this period, the Court found that the EU “cannot, on any view, have incurred liabil-
ity.”185 Though the tone of the judgment could hardly be considered generous to the possible
effects of WTO law before EU courts, by engaging with detailed claims rather than dismissing
them in “broad logic,” the question remained concerning the possible direct effect of WTO
law after DSB or Appellate Body decisions.186
The Van Parys case followed.187 After a negative 1997 DSB finding on EU banana imports, the
EU implemented a new Regulation188 “expressly” referring to the aim of bringing EU rules into
compliance with the WTO system.189 This was found not to have been successful by the WTO in
1999, and the Court acknowledged that at that point the time limit had expired.190 Van Parys
challenged the Regulation, but the combined considerations of expired time limit and possible
Nakajima-type implementation principle191 were not sufficient for WTO rules to be relied upon.
The Court instead placed great emphasis on Article 22(2) DSU, allowing for negotiation over
compensation. The Court did acknowledge that the main aim under Article 3(7) DSU was com-
pliance, but also that there is anticipation of continued breach “where the immediate withdrawal
of the measures is impracticable.”192 Though it is suggested that, at WTO level, “the exception [of
impracticability] has become the rule,”193 the argument is at least engaged with. In Van Parys,
there was no questioning at all of whether impracticability was present, let alone a reference
to the fact that the relevant time period, even in the presence of impracticability, “should not
exceed 15 months.”194 This was so in spite of the reference from the Belgian court being lodged
in 2002, some three years after the negative WTO finding. The Court’s refusal to acknowledge the
shift from political discretion to legal obligation in WTO proceedings at any stage and its avoid-
ance of Nakajima when it is “hard to envisage” a more relevant case, has been criticized by
scholars.195
What is notable for our purposes concerning this WTO case law is the Court’s disinclination
to pick a clear course and stick to it. Instead, discretion is retained—at the expense of legal
183ECJ, Case C-69/89, Nakajima v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:1991:186 (July 5, 1991) https://curia.europa.eu/juris/documents.jsf?
num=C-69/89. See also supra notes 229–36 and accompanying text.
184See Biret International, Case C-93/02P at para. 74.
185Id. at para. 67.
186In addition to the already noted passages, the Court added, “[t]he purpose of the WTO agreements is to govern relations
between States or regional organisations for economic integration and not to protect individuals.” See id. at para. 72.
187ECJ, Case C-377/02, Léon van Parys NV v. Belgisch Interventieen Restitutiebureau, ECLI:EU:C:2005:121 (Mar. 1, 2005),
https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-377/02.
188Council Regulation 1637/98 of July 20, 1998, amending Regulation (EEC) No. 404/93 On the Common Organisation of
the Market in Bananas, 1998 O.J. (L 210) 28 (EC).
189EECKHOUT, supra note 53, at 364.
190Leon van Parys, Case C-377/02 at para. 50.
191Nakajima, Case C-69/89. Considered below, at Part 4.2.6.
192Id. at para. 43.
193Peter-Tobias Stoll & Arthur Steinmann, WTO Dispute Settlement: The Implementation Stage, 3 MAX PLANCK Y.B.
UNITED NATIONS L. 407, 411 (1999).
194DSU art. 21(3).
195See EECKHOUT, supra note 53, at 364. See also Piet Eeckhout, The Appellate Bodies and the Courts, in WTO LAW AND
PROCESS: THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2005 AND 2006 ANNUAL WTO CONFERENCES (Federico Ortino & Sergey Ripinsky eds.,
2007); Pieter Jan Kuijper, It Shall contribute to . . . the Strict Observance and Development of International Law . . . The Role of
the Court of Justice, in THE COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE: ANALYSES AND PERSPECTIVES ON SIXTY
YEARS OF CASE-LAW (Springer ed., 2013).
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certainty and applicants—even in circumstances where the Court appears to have backed itself
into a corner.196
4. Discretion Through Redeployment of the Conferral of Rights Test
Building from experience, rather than principle, one may then simply need to think that WTO
agreements are of a different ilk concerning their non-conferral of rights, among other things,
precluding reliance. Indeed, commenting on Simutenkov,197 Jacobs notes that “it seems as if
the nature of the Agreement is no longer an obstacle to direct effect, so long as the
Agreement contains provisions which . . . directly govern the position of individuals.”198 This case
concerned a Partnership and Cooperation agreement, which creates a more limited relationship
between parties than Association Agreements.199 In case law concerning the latter, it has been
noted that the Court will often simply proceed to consider whether the specific provision a hand
is sufficiently “clear, precise and unconditional” before then reflecting on the nature of the agree-
ment. As Jacobs puts it, it would make little sense to consider a specific provision’s direct effect
only to refuse direct effect on the basis of the broad scope and logic of the agreement; accordingly,
the Court has not done so.200 Therefore, there is a presumption towards direct effect; “[s]uch a
reference [to the nature of the agreement] is perhaps a relic of an earlier period.”201
However, in Intertanko,202 which concerned the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS),203 the Court reasoned that “individuals are in principle not granted independent
rights and freedoms by virtue of UNCLOS”204 and that “UNCLOS does not establish rules
intended to apply directly and immediately to individuals and to confer upon them rights or free-
doms capable of being relied upon against States, irrespective of the attitude of the ship’s flag
State.”205 The Court has been criticized heavily for its “curt” assertions and defensive stance con-
cerning direct effect.206 It is also notable that in refusing direct effect, the Court also expressly
closes the door on any possible argument concerning reciprocity in application of the agreement,
unlike in WTO case law.
In Intertanko, Advocate General Kokott is suggested to have been “wrongfooted”207 by the con-
clusion which the Court reached concerning the lack of direct effect. The confusion was still
greater because, in Poulsen, a case concerning an EU Regulation seeking to control fishing on
196The uncertainty has prompted others to try—unsuccessfully—again. See ECJ, Case C-120/06, FIAMM and Others v.
Council, ECLI:EU:C:2008:476 (Sept. 9, 2008), https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-120/06&language=en; ECJ,
Case C-306/13 LVP NV v. Belgische Staat, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2465 (Dec. 18, 2014), https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?
num=C-306/13&language=EN.
197ECJ, Case C-265/03, Simutenkov v. Ministerio de Educacion y Cultura and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2005:213, (Apr. 12, 2005),
https://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d2dc30db1450f0974b954b61bb23bc1b656c831a.e34KaxiLc3qMb40Rch0
SaxuKaNr0?docid=66313&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=4341448.
198Francis G. Jacobs, The Internal Effects of the EU’s International Agreements and the Protection of Individual Rights, in, A
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER OF STATES?: ESSAYS IN EU LAW IN HONOUR OF ALAN DASHWOOD 536 (Anthony Arnull et. al. eds.,
2011).
199Maresceau, supra note 168, at 426.
200See Jacobs, supra note 198, at 532.
201Id. at 536.
202ECJ, Case C-308/06, Intertanko and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2008:312 (June 3, 2008), https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?
language=en&num=C-308/06.
203Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 19, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, [hereinafter, UNCLOS].
204Id. para. 59.
205Id. para. 64. The Court defensively added that doubt was not cast on this by Part XI of UNCLOS—addressing natural and
legal persons exploration, use and exploitation of the ocean floor. See, id.
206See MENDEZ, supra note 4, at 319. See also Jan Wouters & Philip de Man, International Association of Independent
Tanker Owners (Intertanko), International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners (Intercargo), Greek Shipping Cooperation
Committee, Lloyd's Register and International Salvage Union V. Secretary of State for Transport, 103 AM. J. INT’L. L. 555 (2009).
207MENDEZ, supra note 4, at 275.
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the high seas, some rules within UNCLOS—which the EU was not yet party to—were applied
analogously as CIL rules. Of course, not all UNCLOS rules will be CIL, but attention has been
drawn to the fact that the Court did not even engage with this potential,208 let alone the ironic
sequitur: Making UNCLOS formally binding on the EU simultaneously made it less enforceable.
In contrast to Intertanko, in EDF,209 the Court found direct effect of the Barcelona Convention
for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution. Article 6(3) of the Convention pro-
vided that “discharges shall be strictly subject to the issue, by the competent national authorities,
of an authorisation.”210 However, a Commission action against France three months later con-
firmed that France had provided only “operating instructions” to EDF but that it was in breach
of the Convention in doing so.211 This did not preclude a private individual from being able to
rely on the Convention as against EDF in the interim, a conclusion which Pavoni notes the Court
reached “without enquiring into whether the pertinent treaty norms on the regulation of pollution
from land-based sources attributed rights to individuals.”212 Mendez suggests that the explanation
for the previous approach in EDF when compared to Intertanko was “the important distinction—
a challenge to domestic rather than EU action.”213 This is a hidden factor, as it is one with which
the Court has never been willing to engage in its case law, and suggests rules which vary according
to latent discretion.
One may also speculate that in both cases the environment was protected, meaning that
normative concerns may have led to two very different interpretations of what amounts to con-
ferring rights. Ultimately, externally the conferral of rights test’s resurgence has meant an addi-
tional means of utilizing discretion for the Court, particularly as it remains ill-defined.
5. Discretion in Determining Whether a Specific Provision Within a Directly Effective Agreement May
be Relied Upon
The “clear, precise and unconditional” requirement of the test has been less problematic than that
concerning “broad scope and logic.” It has thus received less coverage in prominent accounts of
the case law.214 A recent exception, though, notes flexibility and subjectivity in application of this
element.215
Razanatsimba216 marked divergence from the internal rule concerning the specific wording of a
provision, thereby providing a further locus for the Court to utilize its discretion. The case
concerned the Lomé Convention, a former international trade and aid agreement between the
EU and African Caribbean and Pacific countries. Article 62 of that agreement provided
for non-discrimination concerning establishment unless “a Member is unable to provide such
treatment.”217 Mr. Razanatsimba was noted by the Court as seeking “to rely upon the principles
208Wouters & de Man, supra note 206, at 557 adding that the “lapse is striking in view of the Court's express acknowl-
edgment in Poulsen that many provisions of the LOS Convention were ‘considered to express the current state of customary
international maritime law’”. See id. at para. 10.
209ECJ, Case C-213/03, Syndicat Professionnel Coordination des Pêcheurs de l'Etang de Berre et de la Region v. EDF, ECLI:
EU:C:2004:464 (July 15, 2004), https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-213/03.
210Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution (Barcelona Convention), art. 6(3), Aug. 14,
1978, 27 U.N.T.S. 1102.
211ECJ, Case C-239/03, Commission v. France (Étang de Berre), ECLI:EU:2004:598, (Oct. 7,2004), para. 85, https://curia.
europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-239/03.
212See Pavoni, supra note 149, at 353. See similarly, Pal Wannerås, THE ENFORCEMENT OF EC ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 25
(2007).
213Mendez, supra note 4, at 276.
214Holdgaard opts not to analyze it in his monograph on the basis that it “is largely identical to the internal direct effect
test.” See Holdgaard, supra note 15, at 273. See similarly Maresceau, supra note 168, at 295.
215Ghazaryan, supra note 24, at 54.
216ECJ, Case C-65/77, Razanatsimba, ECLI:EU:C:1977:193, (Nov. 24, 1977), https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?
language=en&num=C-65/77.
217Convention of Lomé, art. 62, Feb. 28, 1975, O.J. (L 25/2).
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which form the basis of the judgment of the Court . . . [in] Reyners.”218 The outcome of that case
essentially found “that direct effect could apply even where the Member States possessed discre-
tion, because the exercise thereof could be judicially controlled.”219 Here though, the Court
adopted a more restrictive reading by which a Member State or ACP State not adhering to
non-discrimination “is not guilty of any infringement” but “merely exposes itself to the risk of
a retaliatory measure by the other party.”220
The Court’s conclusion and referral to what it termed “negative reciprocity” is interesting. In
case law concerning agreements outside of GATT/WTO law, it has not often made reference to
reciprocity, except often to note—as with this agreement—that the EU has undertaken asymmet-
rical obligations, and that accordingly the Court should enforce them.221 Perhaps then, the con-
ditionality of the requirement here was the key to the Court’s conclusion? Eeckhout considered
that the Court “did not expressly rule on direct effect” and that “as the provision at issue contained
an open-ended reservation, granting participating States a wide discretionary power, it was impos-
sible to consider its direct application.”222 But this does mark a significant divergence from
Reyners.223 The case certainly evidences that the “specific provision” test is not, as is often sug-
gested, equivalent to the internal test and that there is complexity within it.
This case may remain an anomaly,224 but the sheer presence of this case creates concerns where
the “broad scope and logic” of an agreement has been found not to be problematic yet the Court
may wish to limit the effects of it in a future case. Equally, the Court may be less inclined to pre-
clude direct effect based on “broad scope and logic”225—as this limits its discretion in the future—
and so may make increased use of the “specific provision” test.
The Slovak Brown Bear case is perhaps evidence of the dexterity and usefulness of the “specific
provision” test compared to the “broad scope and logic” test moving forward.226 Here, the Court
was not inclined to overcome conditionality inherent in Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention,
concerning access to justice, in order to require a Slovakian court to apply it directly so as to enable
an organization to have greater access to justice in judicial review proceedings concerning
environmental matters.227 Judicial review at EU level is notoriously narrow in scope for private
individuals’ standing. On this basis, it was inevitable that a case would arrive concerning not
Member State rules on access to justice but EU rules.228 This may explain the fact that the
218Razanatsimba, Case C-65/77, para. 10, citing ECJ, Case C-2/74 Reyners v. Belgian State, ECLI:EU:C:1974:68, (June 21,
1974), https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&jur=C,T,F&num=2-74&td=ALL.
219Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 190 (6th ed. 2015).
220Razanatsimba, Case C-65/77.
221See e.g., ECJ, Case C-87/75, Conceria Daniele Bresciani v. Amministrazzione Italiana delle Finanze dello Stato, ECLI:EU:
C:1976:18, (Feb. 5, 1976), para. 23, https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&jur=C,T,F&num=87/75&td=ALL.
222EECKHOUT, supra note 53, at 333.
223See e.g., Alexander Somek, Monism: A Tale of the Undead, in CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
AND BEYOND 358 (Matej Abevlj & Jan Komárek eds., 2012) (applying this principle to EU law itself).
224See e.g., Mendez, supra note 4, at 128, there Mendez describes Case C-18/90 ONEM v Kziber [1991] ECR I-199 as “the
fountain from which nearly all later jurisprudential developments pertaining to social security provisions in Community
Agreements have stemmed.”; Mario Mendez, The legal effect of Community agreements: maximalist treaty enforcement
and judicial avoidance techniques, 21 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 83, 92 (2010) (highlighting that “[t]he direct effect finding [in
Kziber] bore a stark resemblance, unmentioned by the ECJ, to the approach to internal Community law as evinced most
famously in the Reyners ruling where the absence of explicitly textually envisaged implementation measures was not permitted
to stand in the way of the direct effect holding.”).
225Not least due to the criticisms that often follow such a blanket finding, for example, regarding WTO law.
226ECJ, Case C-240/09, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK v. Ministerstvo životného prostredia Slovenskej republiky
(‘Slovak Brown Bear’), ECLI:EU:C:2011:125, (Mar. 8, 2011), https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=c-
240/09.
227For the argument that it should have, see Pavoni, supra note 149, at 357.
228See id. at 360. See also EJC, Joined Cases 404 & 405/12, Council and Commission v. Stichting Natuur en Milieu and
Pesticide Action Network Europe, ECLI:EU:C:2015:5, (Jan. 13, 2015), https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&
num=C-404/12%20P.
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Court declined to grant direct effect of this specific provision despite direct effect of other Aarhus
provisions being possible. The “specific provision” test here then provided delicacy in discretion
that “broad scope and logic’” tests cannot.
6. Limited Discretion Through Presumed “Direct Effect” of Customary International law
It will be discussed below229 that relative strength with which CIL is applied in the Court may be
weaker than that of treaties to which the EU is a party. This is so as the Court today appears to
limit its review of the legislator’s action to “manifest errors in assessment.”230 Conversely, and
likely because of this state of affairs, the potential for an individual to rely upon CIL has been
more liberal. The case law has tended towards a presumption of direct effect, with the Court fre-
quently simply stating that the EU “must respect international law in the exercise of its powers.”231
Air Transport232 saw a somewhat different approach to previous case law. In order to establish
that the claimant could rely upon the international rule the Court focused on EU law. The
international rule only had to be “capable of calling into question the competence of the
European Union to adopt that act,”233 however, the Union act had to be “liable to affect rights
which the individual derives from European Union law or to create obligations under
European law.”234 Though odd—given that this was a preliminary reference and direct effect
or quasi-direct effect of the EU provision is not typically a requirement—the latter test would
frequently be met with ease. This test was indeed met in Air Transport as the claimant would,
as an association of commercial airline operators, have been required to comply with the provi-
sions of the directive.235
The approach to reliance on CIL still remains starkly more generous when compared with the
labyrinth developments in international treaties to which the EU is a party;236 although we will see
below that application of CIL is often weaker.
7. Discretion Through Selective Application of Reference and Implementation Principles
A variation to direct effect has manifested itself in the “implementation” and “reference” princi-
ples founded in theNakajima237 and Fediol238 cases respectively. Koutrakos notes of the Fediol and
Nakajima cases that to create this exception the court there viewed “the duties undertaken by
GATT as ‘internalised’ in the Community legal order.”239 This raises questions regarding the
229See supra notes 142–150 and accompanying text.
230ECJ, Case C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2011:864 (Dec. 21, 2011), para. 110,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-366/10.
231Id. at para 123; ECJ, Case C-162/96, Racke v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, ECLI:EU:C:1998:293, (June 16, 1998), para. 45, https://
curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&jur=C,T,F&num=C-162/96&td=ALL; ECJ, Case C-286/90, Anklagemindigheden v.
Poulsen and Diva Navigation, ECLI:EU:C:1992:453, (Nov. 24, 1992), para. 9, https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-
286/90.
232Air Transport Association of America and Others, Case C-366/10.
233Id. at para. 107.
234Id.
235Directive 2008/101/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 amending Directive 2003/
87/EC so as to include aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community,
2009 O.J. (L 8/3).
236For a criticism of the Court’s divergent approaches to international treaties and customary international law, see Jan
Wouters & Dries Van Eeckhoutte, The Enforcement of Customary International Law through EC Law, in DIRECT EFFECT:
RETHINKING A CLASSIC OF EC LEGAL DOCTRINE (J. M. Prinssen & A. Schrauwen eds., 2004).
237ECJ, Case C-69/89, Nakajima v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:1991:186 (July 5, 1991) https://curia.europa.eu/juris/documents.jsf?
num=C-69/89.
238ECJ, Case C-70/87, Fediol v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1989:254, (June 22, 1989), https://curia.europa.eu/juris/
documents.jsf?num=70/87.
239KOUTRAKOS, supra note 21, at 262.
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assertion in Haegeman II which appeared to internalize all international treaties as an “integral
part of [EU] law.”240
Nakajima and Fediol would seem to provide that, notwithstanding a lack of direct effect, such
agreements can provide a benchmark against which to review the legislature’s actions. This poten-
tially undermines the Court’s reasons that such agreements preclude review generally due to their
nature or lack of precision. Moreover, the fact that “there is no evidence that other WTOmembers
have a similar exception [to Nakajima and Fediol]”241 undermines equally the rationale of reci-
procity in the Court’s WTO law more generally.
Confusion in this area is exacerbated by the Intertanko judgment. As the Court acknowledged,
the directive provided that it would apply “in accordance with international law,” with specific
reference made to UNCLOS.242 But in spite of clear reference in the legislation to UNCLOS,
the Court simply went on to highlight a lack of direct effect. Thus, in Intertanko the Court
did not engage with the reference principle all, with no explanation of why this should be so.
Though König considers that the directive in Intertanko could have remained intact were
UNCLOS to be fully applied,243 others disagree.244 One cynical suggestion might be that in
Fediol and Nakajima the challenges were ultimately unsuccessful.
However, though such a simplistic “meta-narrative” may provide a degree of legal certainty,
Mendez draws attention to the fact that the General Court has annulled regulations and decisions
on the basis of international law245 and that the Court has also done so in Petrotub.246 These cases
all concerned anti-dumping rules and today scholars suggest that the reference and implementa-
tion principles are limited to GATT/WTO law, and probably only to anti-dumping within that;247
however, until recently the case law gave a very different impression.
In Bettati248 an EU regulation was adopted in order to fulfil the commitments entered into
under the Vienna Convention of 22 March 1985 for the Protection of the Ozone Layer. The
Court stated that “[i]t is settled law that Community legislation must, so far as possible, be inter-
preted in a manner that is consistent with international law, in particular where its provisions
are intended specifically to give effect to an international agreement concluded by the
Community.”249 Though conflation of indirect effect—a mere interpretative tool—and the
implementation principle—a basis for review—rendered the Court’s position less clear, there
was an implication that the implementation principle could be relevant beyond anti-dumping
and even WTO case law.
240ECJ, Case 181/73, Haegeman v. Belgium, ECLI:EU:C:1974:41, (Apr. 30, 1973), paras. 4-6, https://curia.europa.eu/juris/
liste.jsf?num=C-181/73.
241MENDEZ, supra note 4, at 238.
242See Intertanko and Others, Case C-308/06, at para. 24 (citing Council Directive 2005/35/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on ship-source pollution and on the introduction of penalties, particularly criminal
penalties, for infringements, 2005 O.J. (L322/8), art. 3(1)).
243Doris König, The EU Directive on Ship-Source Pollution and on the Introduction of Penalties for Infringements:
Development or Breach of International Law?, in LAW OF THE SEA, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES:
LIBER AMICORUM JUDE THOMAS A. MENSAH (Tafsir Malick Ndiaye & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 2007). See also, ECJ, Case
C-308/06, Interanko and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2007:689 (Nov. 20, 2007), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&
num=C-308/06.
244MENDEZ, supra note 4, at 100.
245Id. at 302.
246ECJ, Case C-76/00P, Petrotub v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:2003:4, (Jan. 9, 2003), https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?
language=en&num=C-76/00%20P.
247“In any event the case law has gradually reduced the scope for invoking the principle . . . [except] in the field of anti-
dumping.” See EECKHOUT, supra note 53, at 361. See similarly, Szilard Gáspár-Szilágyi, The Relationship Between EU Law And
International Agreements: Restricting The Application Of The Fediol And Nakajima Exceptions In Vereniging Milieudefensie, 52
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1059 (2015); KOUTRAKOS, supra note 21, at 306.
248ECJ, Case C-341/95, Bettati v. Safety Hi-Tech Srl, ECLI:EU:C:1998:353, (July 14, 1998), https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.
jsf?language=en&num=C-341/95.
249Id. at para. 20.
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Racke250 confirmed this further by applying the principle to CIL. The Court identified that the
challenged regulation, which suspended an international agreement with the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, had been adopted so as to comply with CIL governing the suspension
of such agreements.251 The Court drew direct analogies between invocation of CIL and the
Nakajima principle in the judgment252 and conducted a review of EU secondary legislation in
light of international rules, ostensibly on the basis of that principle.253
Commune de Mesquer254 saw the Court return to the principle in passing—although without a
direct reference to Fediol or Nakajima—concerning various conventions providing for liability
caps in the event of oil pollution. Ultimately the precise directive at hand did not, rather conven-
iently for the Court, refer to international conventions on liability, leaving it free to impose a
higher level of liability in total. But the clear prospect of applying the implementation principle
beyond WTO law once more rendered Intertanko all the more questionable, particularly as
Commune de Mesquer was decided after Intertanko.
The above has so far shown little clarity as to who exactly is in the driving seat regarding the
reference and implementation exceptions: Is it the legislature? The Court on an overtly ad hoc
basis? Or is it dependent on the type of international agreement or customary rule?
Stichting saw the General Court and Court disagree profoundly. Though the General Court
found that the regulation “was adopted to meet the European Union’s international obligations
under Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention,”255 the Court ruled that “it cannot be considered
that, by adopting Regulation No 1367/2006 . . . the European Union was intended to implement
the obligations [of the Aarhus Convention].”256 Gáspár-Szilágyi notes that this was held despite
“the more than obvious title which specifically refers to the Aarhus Convention [and the fact that]
almost every recital of the preamble of the Regulation makes references to the Convention.”257
Ultimately the Court “came clean” and stated of Nakajima and Fediol, “those two exceptions
were justified solely by the particularities of the agreements that led to their application.”258 This
overturned the more liberal approach of the General Court, which had relied on the Nakajima
principle and ultimately annulled the regulation on the basis of the Convention. The fact that
the Court neglected even to mention Racke, which formed a cornerstone in the General
Court’s reasoning in evidencing the principle’s application beyond GATT/WTO law,259 is also
a strong indication of the principle’s limitations today. However, caution is warranted given
the Court’s tendency to repurpose seemingly dormant judicial devices.260
250ECJ, Case C-162/96, Racke v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, ECLI:EU:C:1998:293, (June 16, 1998), https://curia.europa.eu/juris/
liste.jsf?language=en&jur=C,T,F&num=C-162/96&td=ALL.
251Id. at para. 19.
252Racke is invoking fundamental rules of customary international law against the disputed regulation, which was taken
pursuant to those rules, and deprives Racke of the rights to preferential treatment granted to it by the Cooperation Agreement.
For a comparable situation in relation to basic rules of a contractual nature, see ECJ, Case C-69/89, Nakajima v. Council, ECLI:
EU:C:1991:186 (July 5, 1991), paras. 31 & 48, https://curia.europa.eu/juris/documents.jsf?num=C-69/89.
253Concerning the controversy over the Court’s interpretation of CIL, see below at 4.3.1.
254ECJ, Case C-188/07, Commune de Mesquer v. Total France SA and Total International Ltd, ECLI:EU:C:2008:359, (June
24, 2008), https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-188/07.
255ECJ, Case T-338/08, Stichting Natuur en Milieu and Pesticide Action Network Europe v. European Commission, ECLI:
EU:T:2012:300, (June 14, 2012), para. 58, https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=T-338/08.
256EJC, Joined Cases 404 & 405/12, Council and Commission v. Stichting Natuur en Milieu and Pesticide Action Network
Europe, ECLI:EU:C:2015:5, (Jan. 13, 2015), https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-404/12%20P.
257Gáspár-Szilágyi, supra note 246, at 1063.
258EJC, Joined Cases 404 & 405/12, Council and Commission v. Stichting Natuur en Milieu and Pesticide Action Network
Europe, ECLI:EU:C:2015:5, (Jan. 13, 2015), para. 49, https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-404/12%
20P.
259See ECJ, Stichting Natuur en Milieu, Case T-338/08 at para. 56.
260For example, the conferral of rights test.
582 Rupert Dunbar
III. Manifestations of Discretion in External Relations Case Law II: Application of International Law
Holdgaard observes “[t]he hierarchical status of international agreements concluded by the
Community has never been much disputed,”261 sitting above secondary legislation but below
the Treaty. CIL is ranked similarly. Of course, “the practical effect of a hierarchically superior
rule of international law depends on whether or not it can be directly invoked.”262 If granted,
hierarchy would simply dictate mechanical application of a superior rule to invalidate a lower
ranked one. However, the multifaceted discretion accruing to the Court through modifications
to direct effect above has not proven sufficient to redress the absence of proportionality.
Accordingly, we can now chart some further modifications which have also enhanced the
Court’s discretion at the application stage.
1. Discretion Through Opportunistic Interpretations of Provisions of International Agreements
and CIL
This Article has identified above that the Court has taken a more liberal view towards the invo-
cation of CIL than it has to international agreements. However, it appears the Court has limited its
view of what CIL demands.
In Woodpulp,263 the Court dealt with a challenge that Article 101 TFEU was being applied
extraterritorially, as an agreement to restrict competition had been concluded outside of the
EU. However, its effect was to restrict competition within the EU. Therefore the Court asserted
that “the Community’s jurisdiction to apply its competition rules to such conduct is covered by the
territoriality principle as universally recognised in public international law.”264 The implication
though was that EU action, and even the EU Treaty, would be appropriately constrained by CIL.
However, Intertanko demonstrates that the Court will not necessarily be quick to accept that
international rules reflect custom. In Poulsen the Court said of UNCLOS that “many of its pro-
visions are considered to express the current state of customary international maritime law.”265 In
Intertanko the Court stated:
Admittedly, as is clear from settled case-law, the powers of the Community must be exercised
in observance of international law, including provisions of international agreements in so far
as they codify customary rules of general international law . . . .266
The Court cited Poulsen, but it did not clearly address UNCLOS in this regard. Even the later
statement that “UNCLOS’s main objective is to codify, clarify and develop the rules of general
international law”267 did not prompt the Court to do so. The lack of analysis in Intertanko in this
regard has been said to be striking.268
Where accepted as relevant, case law has also shown the complexities which can arise concern-
ing interpretations of CIL. The decisions have been met with some criticism. Opel Austria,269
261Holdgaard, supra note 15, at 245.
262Id.
263ECJ, Joined Cases 89 & 104/85, Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and Others v. Commission of the European Communities, ECLI:
EU:C:1994:12, (Jan. 20, 1994), https://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?text=&docid=93657&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&
mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1607495.
264Id. at para 18.
265ECJ, Case C-286/90, Anklagemindigheden v. Poulsen and Diva Navigation, ECLI:EU:C:1992:453, (Nov. 24, 1992), para.
10, https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-286/90.
266See ECJ, Case C-308/06, Intertanko and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2008:312 (June 3, 2008), para. 51, https://curia.europa.eu/
juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-308/06.
267Id. at para. 55.
268Wouters & de Man, supra note 206, at 557.
269ECJ, Case T-115/94, Opel Austria v. Council, ECLI:EU:T:1997:3, (July, 15, 1998), ECR II-39, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61994TJ0115:EN:PDF
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a case at the General Court (then CFI), is notable in that it saw the rare occurrence of EU sec-
ondary law being invalidated where international law was invoked. However, on closer inspection,
the extent to which international law formed the basis for invalidation, rather than the EU prin-
ciple of legitimate expectations, emerges as questionable. The case concerned the adoption of a
regulation which was argued to be in breach of a signed, but not yet in force, EEA treaty.270 The
General Court held that “the principle of good faith is a rule of customary international law.”271
However, it found it to be a “corollary . . . of the [EU general] principle of protection of legitimate
expectations.”272 Ultimately the General Court referred to the regulation as having “infringed the
applicant’s legitimate expectations”273 rather than the principle of good faith. Eeckhout notes that
the principle was “channeled”274 throughout EU law. Konstadinides takes a sterner approach in
stating that “despite the custom-friendly outcome,”275 in reality “[i]t makes more sense to argue
that the customary principle of good faith was not the real ground for annulment.”276 This sug-
gestion is further supported by the Air Transport277 case, concerning airline emissions, which fur-
ther limited the extent to which CIL—in and of itself—is a genuine restraint on EU action. The
Court found that278:
[S]ince a principle of customary international law does not have the same degree of precision
as a provision of an international agreement, judicial review must necessarily be limited to
the question whether, in adopting the act in question, the institutions of the European Union
made manifest errors of assessment concerning the conditions for applying those
principles.279
Accordingly, a “manifest errors” approach, which was not present in the review on the basis of
EU law in Opel Austria, is present here where CIL alone is applied, with Racke being cited as
justification. However, it is submitted that the reference to Racke is misleading. In Racke the
Court did conclude that “the complexity of the rules in question and the imprecision of some
of the concepts to which they refer”280 meant that only a marginal review of the legislator’s actions
could be conducted. However, the reference was not to all rules of customary law but to “the rules
of customary international law concerning the termination and the suspension of treaty relations
by reason of a fundamental change of circumstances.”281 It is notable that even concerning Racke
this approach was criticized.282
Notwithstanding Racke, the Court’s approach to interpreting CIL in Air Transport itself can be
questioned. Territorial sovereignty is arguably the precursor to the proper functioning of
international law.283 The extension of the concept to airspace is both essential for the proper
270The Court noted that “the Communities were aware of the date on which the EEA Agreement would enter into force”
seven days before conclusion of the contested regulation as they had been the final signatory to approve it. Id. at para. 92.
271Id. at para. 90.
272Id. at para. 93.
273Id. at para. 123.
274EECKHOUT, supra note 53, at 387.
275Theodore Konstadinides, When in Europe: Customary International Law and EU Competence in the Sphere of External
Action, 13 GERMAN. L. J. 1177, 1187 (2012).
276Id. at 1188.
277ECJ, Case C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2011:864 (Dec. 21, 2011), para. 110,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-366/10.
278Id. at para. 110.
279See ECJ, Case C-162/96, Racke v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, ECLI:EU:C:1998:293, (June 16, 1998), para. 52, https://curia.
europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&jur=C,T,F&num=C-162/96&td=ALL.
280Id.
281Id. at para. 46.
282Wouters & Van Eeckhoutte, supra note 235, at 206–07.
283S.S. Lotus (Fr. V. Turk.), Judgement, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at para. 45 (Sept. 7).
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functioning of aviation and uncontroversial. The ICJ describes the rule concerning sovereignty
over airspace as a “basic legal concept,”284confirming “no doubt that . . . prescriptions of
treaty-law285 merely respond to firmly established and longstanding tenets of customary
international law.”286 This does not sit well with the Court’s assertion that the rule lacked
precision.287
Arguably, the outcome simply evidences the problem by which environmental protection has
developed in importance in more recent years, a development with which external relations case
law, based in hierarchy and formalism, has struggled to keep up. Advocate General Kokott
appeared to acknowledge this problem and encourage change in stating:
[The Court’s] judgment will be of fundamental importance not only to the future shaping of
European climate change policy but also generally to the relationship between European
Union (EU) law and international law. In particular it will be necessary to consider whether
and to what extent individuals are entitled to rely in court on certain international agree-
ments and principles of customary international law in order to defeat an act of the
European Union.288
Though the Court was not so colorful, it did refer to the importance of “environmental pro-
tection objectives which it has set for itself.”289 But, as Koutrakos points out, this point was irrel-
evant in the current constellation of the case law.290 Although few would question that it did, in
fact, influence the Court.
Moreover, if we reconsider Air Transport, which concerned the expansion of the EU emissions
trading scheme to airlines, in light of Arcelor, which also featured the expansion of the emissions
trading scheme to steel producers, then a further impact of the absence of proportionality is ap-
parent. In Arcelor the Court provided a margin to the legislature as it should have a “broad dis-
cretion where its action involves political, economic and social choices.”291 From the legislature’s
perspective though, it is clear which expansion was more complex,292 but the Court’s rules gov-
erning reception and application of international law could not accommodate this, hence the
interpretative strain to find CIL uncertain.
It is not just CIL which has seen strained interpretation. A prominent example of opportunistic
interpretation of an international treaty is ELFAA.293 The case saw a challenge to an EU regulation
on the basis that it breached the Montreal Convention. The Montreal Convention provides for the
284Military And Paramilitary Activities In And Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 212
(June 27).
285The ICJ made reference inter alia to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 15 U.N.T.S.
295.
286Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v U.S.) Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 212. Shaw
notes that the principle of territorial sovereignty over airspace developed “very quickly in the years immediately before and
during the First World War.” See, MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 (7th ed. 2014).
287ECJ, Case C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2011:864 (Dec. 21, 2011), para. 110,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-366/10.
288See Opinion of Advocate General Kokott at para. 4, Case C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America and Others
(Oct. 6, 2011), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-366/10.
289See Air Transport, Case C-366/10 at para. 128.
290KOUTRAKOS, supra note 21, at 318.
291ECJ, Case C-127/07, Société Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine and Others v. Premier Minister, ECLI:EU:C:2008:728
(Dec. 16, 2008), para. 57, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-127/07.
292On complexity of international affairs requiring a “wide discretion” for the legislature generally, see KOUTRAKOS, supra
note 21, at 183. On the “climate change regime complex” specifically, see Joanne Scott & Lavanya Rajamani, EU Climate
Change Unilateralism, 23 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 469, 470 (2012).
293ECJ, Case C-344/04, IATA and ELFAA, ECLI:EU:C:2006:10 (Jan. 10, 2006), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?
language=en&num=C-344/04.
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circumstances and amount of compensation to which passengers are entitled. The EU is a party to
the Montreal Convention and the Court found the relevant articles of the Convention to have
direct effect.294 It then referred to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLoT) and directed itself that an international treaty “must be interpreted . . . in good faith
in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the light
of its object and purpose.”295
However, in spite of the Court acknowledging the Montreal Convention limiting liability of
carriers to set amounts,296 the Court reasoned that “[t]he system prescribed in Article 6 [of
the regulation] simply operates at an earlier stage than the system which results from the
Montreal Convention.”297 Thus the challenge was unfounded; the EU legislature was free to
impose liability, even in extraordinary circumstances, as the Court felt that it was regulating a
distinct aspect of compensation not covered by the Convention.
The Court reasoned that the Convention covered individual damage sustained by passengers—
who could then bring a claim—but that the regulation covered “standardised and immediate
assistance.”298 The Court implicitly acknowledges the potential for some overlap with the
Convention, stating “[t]he standardised and immediate assistance and care measures do not
themselves prevent the passengers concerned, should the same delay also cause them damage
conferring entitlement to compensation, from being able to bring in addition actions to redress
that damage under the conditions laid down by the Montreal Convention.”299
In spite of passengers not being able to claim twice for the same damage, there is the problem
that the 4 150 SDRs cap is now artificially raised. Mendez also draws attention to the fact that the
Convention contains an exclusivity provision, allowing for passengers to seek damages only
through it.300 Overall there is heavy criticism of the reasoning adopted by the Court.301
It is submitted that Air Transport and ELFAA ultimately appear as contorted interpretative
efforts deployed to pursue environmental protection and consumer protection, respectively.
The norms of consumer and environmental protection are indeed important, but their accom-
modation through the finding of interpretative room within international provisions that appear
to allow none is problematic for legal certainty. Proportionality analysis would have provided for
richer argumentation and engagement with the facts and, given the heavy criticism of both cases,
could not have damaged perceptions of the EU’s respectfulness towards EU law any further.
2. Discretion Through Recourse to the Concept of an Autonomous Legal System
The EU legal system “cannot be prejudiced by an international agreement.”302 This infamous
phrase in fact belies the outcome of the Kadi case law. As is well known, in Kadi the Court
was confronted with an EU regulation which transposed a UN Security Council Resolution aimed
at combatting terrorism by listing terrorist suspects and suspected financiers. The potential
infringement on fundamental rights was subjected to a limited review on the basis of jus cogens
by the General Court, in deference to the international origin of the EU regulation. The Court
instead reviewed the EU Regulation on the basis of EU law and made that clear through the lan-
guage of autonomy. But on closer inspection, the autonomous legal system is quite permeable.
294Id. at para. 39.
295Id. at para. 40.
296Id. at para. 42.
297Id. at para. 46.
298Id. at para. 43.
299Id. at para. 47.
300MENDEZ, supra note 4, at 270.
301See e.g., id. at 269–270; Aust, Rodiles & Staubach, supra note 38, at 75; B. Harris, The ‘Force Of Law’ Of International
Carriage Conventions In The EU Internal Market, 25 INT’L COMPANY & COM. L. REV. 98, 105–6 (2014).
302ECJ, Joined Cases 402 & 415/05P, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission (Kadi I),
ECLI:EU:C:2008:461, Judgement of Sept. 3, 2008, at 316, https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-402/05.
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“The Court must determine whether a fair balance has been struck between the demands of the
public interest and the interest of the individuals concerned” and that public interest must be
judged “[w]ith reference to an objective of general interest as fundamental to the international
community as the fight by all means . . . against the threats to international peace and security
posed by acts of terrorism.”303 Accordingly the international political and legal context permeated
the “autonomous” EU legal system and was balanced against the “very foundations” of that legal
system.304 However, due to the significant shortcomings in the listing process the Court’s appli-
cation of this balance is less discernible.
It is notable though that while the Court noted the multiple flaws in the regulation305 it con-
cluded “annulment to that extent of the contested regulation with immediate effect would be
capable of seriously and irreversibly prejudicing the effectiveness of the restrictive measures
imposed by the regulation and which the Community is required to implement . . . .”306
The Court accordingly allowed the regulation to maintain its effects for three months, within
which time a new regulation was concluded. Thus, in spite of the fact that multiple infringements
of fundamental rights were found, the remedy was simply to provide the legislature with a further
three months in which to remedy the shortcomings. This is markedly deferential to international
law and, of course, recognizes the importance of combatting terrorism, which it would be artificial
to suggest is purely an EU, and not international, concern. The consequence was that a new
Security Council Resolution was passed, transposed into EU law, and then challenged once more
in Kadi II. Five years had passed since the Court’s Kadi I judgment in which the EU legal system
had been declared to be unable to be prejudiced by international law.
Far from “autonomy,” Sena and Vitucci’s argument that “the findings reached in its judgment
can, ultimately, be regarded as the outcome of a direct balancing of the EC principles on funda-
mental rights with the value of cooperation of the EU states with the UN in the fight against
terrorism”307 seems correct. Autonomy here was simply proportionality by another name.
However, autonomy has meant autonomy in cases such asMoxPlant, precluding Member State
submission of a dispute to an international court where EU law is concerned,308 and Opinion 2/13,
refusing accession to the ECHR.309 Equally though it has not been mentioned in cases where it
appeared relevant.310
Though Kadi I shows that autonomy can have a softer and more proportionate side, the
deployment of autonomy is guaranteed to garner much attention and for this reason the term
may have been eschewed in Kadi II. Interestingly, though, the Court returned to autonomy in
Opinion 2/13. Ultimately then the concept itself is elusive and allows for discretion in both deploy-
ment and application, yet falling short of that which proportionality would offer. The label of
autonomy is unhelpful, but the concept of autonomy is confirmatory of the discretion which a
domestic court holds when applying international law. The manifestation of that discretion,
though, would be better served through proportionality.
303Id. at para. 360.
304Id. at para. 344.
305Id. at para 348; Id. at paras. 369–370.
306Id. at para 373.
307Pasquale De Sena & Maria Chiara Vitucci, The European courts and the Security Council: Between Dedoublement
Functionnel and Balancing of Values, 20 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 193, 224 (2009).
308ECJ, Case C-459/03, Commission v. Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:2006:345, (May 30, 2006), https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?
num=C-459/03.
309ECJ, Case C-2/13, Opinion re Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, (Dec. 14, 2014), https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.
jsf?docid=160882&doclang=EN.
310See e.g., ECJ, Case C-584/10, Commission and others v. Kadi (‘Kadi II’), ECLI:EU:C:2013:518, (July 18, 2013), https://
curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-584/10; ECJ, Case C-364/10, Hungary v. Slovakia, ECLI:EU:C:2012:630, (Oct. 16, 2012),
https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-364/10&language=EN stating that fundamental freedom of movement of the
Hungarian President was curtailed based on the international treaty and CIL.
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3. External Relations Cases Which Have Seen the Deployment of Proportionality
It is appropriate to end our analysis of the case law with an anomaly or two: The Court’s deploy-
ment of proportionality analysis in the application of international law.
Omega Air311 concerned secondary legislation which sought to limit noise pollution of aircraft.
The Court engaged with the principle of proportionality and stated that “with respect to judicial
review . . . the Community legislature has wide legislative powers in the field of the common trans-
port policy as regards the adoption of appropriate common rules.”312 In favorably reviewing the
legislature’s actions, the Court even invoked ICAO assembly resolutions, which it claimed
endorsed the approach adopted by the EU.313
Though the Court would later expressly recall the fact that WTO law does not have direct
effect, the passages concerning proportionality appear implicitly to disentangle international pro-
visions in both WTO law and the Chicago Convention—to which the EU is not even party—from
the need for direct effect for the purposes of that analysis.314 Overall, the balance between respect
for international law and protection of the environment appeared to be entertained.
Commission v. Italy also saw deployment of proportionality.315 The case concerned a Free
Trade Agreement with Norway. In finding Italy in breach of the agreement, the Court reasoned
that due to provisions analogous to Article 34 and 36 TFEU, Italy’s requirement for health inspec-
tions of fish had “infringed the principle of proportionality.”316 This application of proportionality
is interesting as it concerns a balance within the international agreement rather than between
protection of EU law and respect for international law.
However, Eeckhout points out that in Commission v. Italy the deployment of proportionality
“[found] little basis in the actual agreement.”317 The international treaty provision allowed for
measures to protect, inter alia, health, provided they do “not constitute a means of arbitrary dis-
crimination or a disguised restriction on trade between the Contracting Parties,” whereas here the
Court balanced the health imperative against the trade imperative, as it would do in internal
case law.
The effort to conclude trade agreements which more appropriately reflect non-trade concerns
within themmeans that this approach may be available to the Court more often, meaning at least a
limited role for proportionality moving forward.318
IV. Reflections on Diffuse Discretion in External Relations Case Law
In internal case law the Court’s discretion does not reside exclusively within the proportionality
test, but it is its primary residence. This is the consequence of accepting reliance on rules without
requiring direct effect in many instances.319 Equally, where direct effect is required320 we have seen
a remarkably liberal approach in finding it to be present. With EU law readily engaged, the Court’s
311ECJ, Joined Cases 27 & 122/00, Omega Air and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2002:161, (Mar. 12, 2002), https://curia.europa.eu/
juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-27/00.
312Id. at para. 63.
313Id. at para. 70.
314The Advocate General also applied the proportionality test. Opinion of Advocate General Alber at paras. 61-87, Cases 27
& 122/00, Omega Air and Others (Mar. 12, 2002).
315ECJ, Case C-228/91, Commission v. Italy, ECLI:EU:C:1993:206, (May 25, 1993), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/
EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A61991CJ0228#SM
316Id. at para. 49.
317EECKHOUT, supra note 53, at 318.
318See e.g., Lonel Zamfir, European Parliamentary Research Service, Human Rights in EU Trade Agreements: The Human
Rights Clause And Its Application, (July 2019), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/637975/EPRS_
BRI(2019)637975_EN.pdf.
319TFEU arts. 258, 259, 263; TFEU art. 267.
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practice is to then postulate competing interests at the same level and to resolve them with con-
sideration of the unique facts of the given case in a proportionality analysis.
Externally, direct effect has been more actively deployed as a gatekeeper of the EU legal order.
Perhaps this is to be expected given that direct effect was justified by the EU being, in the Court’s
view, “a new legal order of international law.”321 However, complexity in external relations cases
arises due to the sheer breadth of the rules, not to mention their variation over time. A further
confounding feature is that the rules of direct effect seem to be heavily influenced by unexpressed
normative concerns to the point where one wonders “whether . . . the actual review which the
judgment avoids, is influencing the answer . . . as to the capacity of the Agreement itself to form
a review criterion vis-à-vis Community law.”322
Moreover, overburdening direct effect as a locus for discretion clearly lacks the refinement of
proportionality analyses. Pavoni notes this problem in Intertanko; by refusing direct effect of a
significant number of UNCLOS provisions, the case led to higher environmental protection
but would, in theory, be equally applicable to EU and Member State conduct in a subsequent case
and accordingly may result in “lower EU standards of environmental protection” in the future.323
Similarly, interpreting away the demands of international law, through eminently subjective
readings of international treaties or claimed uncertainties of CIL which few international scholars
would recognize,324 may ultimately protect EU norms, but it does so by mutating the international
norm itself rather than balancing interests in a given case. This too renders it hard to recant from
in a subsequent case with fresh competing interests.
Ultimately, where proportionality has become dominant in resolving internal complexity,
external recourse to it—in name at least—is a statistical outlier. This results in fragmented case
law which can at times seem capricious, at least until one considers normative factors hidden
behind judgments. Legal certainty is clearly affected by the continued purport of neutrality
and a formal hierarchy, with normative concerns permeating without a clear rationale or mea-
sured resolution and in stark contrast to internal case law.
V. How Could Proportionality in External Case Law be Expanded in the Future?
From the above we can see a significant fragmentation in approaches and even divergences within
individual approaches. It has been argued that these seemingly narrow and often technical dis-
tinctions are best understood through a normative lens. Proportionality is the purest expression of
that normative lens available within EU law.
The sheer presence of proportionality will lessen the pressure on direct effect related rules and
the uncertainty it creates. For example, a finding of direct effect would no longer be fatal to a piece
of EU secondary legislation as it may be justified at the proportionality stage.325 For a similar
reason, international law would also be less susceptible to being imputed with questionable mean-
ing as an avoidance strategy.326 This is particularly important given that although application of
international law—through direct effect tests—is readily accepted as being within the discretion of
domestic courts, interpretation of international law is not. Accordingly, though d’Aspremont and
Dopagne suggest there is an “elementary divide”327 between the application of international law at
321van Gend en Loos, Case C-26/62 at 12.
322MENDEZ, supra note 4, at 100.
323Pavoni, supra note 149, at 356.
324Wouters & Van Eeckhoutte, supra note 235, at 230–31.
325But see ECJ, Case C-308/06, Intertanko and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2008:312 (June 3, 2008), para. 51, https://curia.europa.
eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-308/06.
326As occurred in Air Transport and ELFAA.
327See d'Aspremont & Dopagne, supra note 31, at 371.
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the international and domestic levels, d’Aspremont is more nuanced concerning interpretation;
“when applying the rules of another legal order, judges should heed the rules of interpretation of
that legal order . . . [otherwise] judges would simply apply another rule than the rule originating in
that foreign legal order.”328
With proportionality present the allure for the Court of opportunistic interpretations of
international law and oscillating tests for direct effect as a means to control international law’s
impact would be lessened in external case law. The logic for retaining structural differences com-
pared to internal case law concerning access to justice would also be removed. Consequently, in
the future, approaches in external case law could more closely reflect those already present in
internal case law discussed above. For example, in judicial review cases under Article 263
TFEU, privileged applicants such as Member States should not be dependent on direct effect
of the international provision. Under Article 267 TFEU, preliminary reference questions arising
concerning the legality of EU secondary legislation do not require direct effect internally, nor
should they externally. Direct effect would be required to challenge Member State legislation
under 267 TFEU, as is the case internally: However, direct effect of international law in
Member State cases has often been found and is less uncertain as a result. These changes would
helpfully restore a consistent approach to the balance between actors across both internal and
external case law.
This is not to say that these changes will result in overbearing review of EU action in all
instances, which should also alleviate concerns over floodgates opening to claimants. It should
be remembered that the intensity in proportionality review of EU andMember State action differs.
Member States often need to adopt the least restrictive path, whereas more lenience is afforded to
the EU institutions. The practice of allowing a margin of appreciation to the EU legislature would
seem appropriate here, given that its basis tends to be the complexity of judgements which the
legislature must undertake, and International affairs are generally recognized to be an area in
which the executive or legislature has wide discretion.329 Moreover, the odd potential divergence
between cases such as Arcelor, concerning internal expansion of the emissions trading scheme,
and Air Transport, concerning expansion of the same scheme with an international context, would
be remedied. In Air Transport a margin was provided, but not based on the complexity of
judgement required. Instead, unconvincingly, the uncertainty of customary international law
was invoked; were the case to have concerned international treaty law binding on the EU, rather
than customary law, no margin would have been provided to the legislature.
A key limitation to any margin of appreciation arrives concerning the EU’s infringement of the
essence of fundamental rights, and to the extent that this principle is present internally, this would
continue to be the case externally. It is also submitted that the reference and implementation prin-
ciples could appropriately be applied, in and beyond anti-dumping law, through proportionality,
and could also affect the legislature’s margin of appreciation. This seems logical as statements that
EU legislation has been passed “in accordance with” or to implement international law would
mean that, were legislation not to meet this aim, then it would be disproportionate, except argu-
ably in the most complex of instances.
It can be seen that these changes would remove the need for direct effect in some cases and, in
all cases, would lessen uncertainty within direct effect related rules and the need for opportunistic
328See Jean d’Aspremont, The Systemic Integration of International Law by Domestic Courts: Domestic Judges as Architects of
the Consistency of the International Legal Order, in THE PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL COURTS AND THE DE-
FRAGMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 152 (Ole Kristian Fauchald & André Nollkaemper eds. 2012). See also Helmut
Philipp Aust, Between Universal Aspiration and Local Application: Concluding Observations, in THE INTERPRETATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW BY DOMESTIC COURTS: UNITY, DIVERSITY AND CONVERGENCE 339 (Helmut Phillip Aust & Georg
Nolte eds., 2016); Wouters & Van Eeckhoutte, supra note 235, at 207.
329KOUTRAKOS, supra note 21, at 183.
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interpretations of international law by providing a release valve in the form of proportionality. The
question then becomes whether it is helpful to replace multiple small problems with one large
problem; namely, what weight should be afforded to respect for international law within the case
law? It is submitted that this single question was both already present and, indeed, driving the
multiple oscillations and divergences present in the case law, but through a series of smaller syn-
thetic proxies. Instead, by focusing more closely on the large question in scholarship and openly in
the Court, clarity will emerge in a similar fashion to that which occurs internally concerning EU
norms. Incremental arguments based within proportionality concerning respect for international
law in differing contexts will inform future action in a meaningful way and will allow litigants to
argue their case in alignment with the Court’s underlying rationales.
E. Conclusion
What is missing from external relations case law is the capacity for the Court to engage with the facts
of a case in their specific context. Though proportionality has only appeared briefly in external
relations case law and scholarship to date, it does appear to be a point upon which there is gradual
convergence.330 Proportionality provides a convenient means by which to distinguish specific cases
without the need to avoid or mutate international law on specious bases, which has occurred in its
absence. Fully embracing proportionality in external relations case law would see international law
being more readily invoked. However, respect for it would be balanced against other EU norms, with
the consequence that—like all EU norms—respect for international law would be extrinsically
defined, through applying proportionality in specific cases, rather than intrinsically defined through
vacillating assertions about international law’s capability to be relied upon.
When and which EU norms should trump respect for international law? These are clearly ques-
tions for future research, and they would be facilitated by scholars openly acknowledging and
promoting proportionality’s relevance rather than multiplying the range of nomenclatures.
Then meaningful debate on substance can begin. For instance, many would argue that a margin
ought to be provided to the legislature in fields related to international law, and yet others would
argue that there should be heavy presumption in favor of respecting international law. Initially, it
is clear that significant fundamental rights, such as Kadi, should be more likely to be favorably
weighed against international law than more minor issues within consumer protection, such as
ELFAA. But there are more challenging cases, and ones which call for very delicate consideration.
The balance will also necessarily change over time, as all norms develop331 and cases differ.
Proportionality can accommodate this debate and the complexity, which is already inherent in
the case law, whilst simultaneously providing greater legal certainty.
Balancing respect for international law against other EU norms is eminently justifiable from the
perspective of international law—as states retain discretion concerning application of
international law domestically.332 More generally, the diminishing esteem in which the Court’s
case law is held for its respectfulness towards international law means change is now opportune.333
Finally, it should be remembered that the Court is already balancing EU norms such as fun-
damental rights, consumer protection, environmental protection, and trade interests against
330See supra discussion accompanying notes 23–38.
331It is submitted that the Court’s vision of “trade” in external relations case law is particularly inconsistent/limited at cur-
rent as is its monosyllabic tendency to find Member States in breach of international agreements. On the latter see, Mendez,
supra note 4.
332See supra discussion accompanying notes 23–38.
333But see sources cited supra notes 39–53.
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respect for international law. However, it currently does so through the more crude and less legally
certain means of oscillating direct effect tests, opportunistic interpretations, and an incoherent,
autonomous legal system. So, though it does seem that there are embryonic or sporadic references
to proportionality in aspects of both external relations case law and literature, it is also hoped that
there is more to come on both counts.
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